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Abstract 
We estimate the level and distribution of global household wealth. The levels of assets and 
debts for 39 countries are measured using household balance sheet and survey data centred on 
the year 2000. The determinants of mean financial assets, non-financial assets, and liabilities 
are studied empirically, and the results used to estimate average wealth holdings for countries 
lacking direct evidence. Data on the pattern of household distribution of wealth are assembled 
for 20 countries, which together account for 59 per cent of the global population and 75 per 
cent of global wealth. The observed relation between wealth and income distribution in these 
20 countries allows estimates of wealth inequality to be produced for many other nations. 
Combining the figures for individual countries reveals that net worth averaged US$44,024 per 
adult in PPP terms across the globe. Wealth of US$8,635 was needed to be in the top half of 
the global distribution, and US$518,364 to be in the top one per cent. The top 10 per cent 
owned 71 per cent of world wealth, and the Gini coefficient for the global distribution of 
wealth is estimated to be 0.802, indicating greater inequality than that observed in the global 
distribution of consumption or income. 
Keywords: wealth, net worth, personal assets, inequality, households, balance sheets, 
portfolios 
JEL classification: D31, E01, E21, O10 
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1 Introduction 
The world distribution of income has recently been the subject of much attention. Available 
evidence suggests that global income inequality is high and not trending down over time 
(Bourguignon and Morrison 2002; Milanovic 2002, 2005). Indeed, in some regions both 
poverty and income inequality appear to be on the increase. Given these findings, interest 
naturally turns to global disparities in other dimensions of economic status, resources or 
wellbeing, of which one of the most important is household wealth. In recent years the 
number of countries with good wealth data has increased and it is now possible to try to 
estimate the global distribution of household wealth, which is the goal of this paper. 
The core data for this exercise are provided by national wealth distribution data that are 
available for 20 countries. These countries include the largest and richest countries in the 
world and together account for 59% of the world’s population and, we estimate, 75% of its 
wealth. While it is interesting to look at the distribution of wealth just for these countries, and 
we do provide those results, our main focus is on an estimate of the full global distribution of 
wealth. This requires imputation of both wealth levels and distribution to the countries with 
missing data. Much of the paper is occupied with the development and application of those 
imputations. We find that the global distribution of wealth so estimated is quite close to that 
for the 20 core countries—yielding a Gini coefficient of .802 for example in comparison with 
.796 for the core group.  
Estimating the global distribution of wealth involves two stages. First, the average wealth 
level in each country is established. This is done by using national household balance sheet 
(HBS) data, and survey data where there are no HBS numbers, and then extending the wealth 
figures to nations with neither kind of data using regression based imputations. The second 
stage requires the shape of the distribution to be computed for each country. Again there are 
countries with direct data (the 20 referred to above), and others for which the pattern must be 
estimated using the best available proxies. Our ultimate aim is to produce household wealth 
distribution estimates on a per adult basis for the year 20001. This paper focuses almost 
                                                 
1 Although HBS data are available annually in many countries, wealth distribution data typically come from surveys 
that are conducted at intervals of three or more years and whose results are available only with a significant lag. The 
year 2000 provides us with a reasonably recent date and good data availability. 
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exclusively on figures based on purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. Davies et al 
(2008) reports results from earlier work using official exchange rates.2. 
This paper establishes, first, that there are very large inter-country differences in the level of 
household wealth. The USA is the richest country in aggregate terms, with wealth estimated 
at PPP$ 201,319 per adult in the year 2000. At the opposite extreme among countries with 
wealth data, India has per adult wealth of $12,201 in PPP terms. Other countries show a wide 
range of values. Even among high income OECD countries the figures range from $70,461 
for Finland, and $79,585 for New Zealand, to $172,461 for the UK. We also find that the 
wealth to income ratio rises with income or wealth, meaning that in poor countries the relative 
shortfall of wealth is greater than that of income. This is a noteworthy result since the risks, 
capital market imperfections, and lack of social safety nets that people face in poor countries 
mean that personal assets seem to be most lacking where they are most needed.  
International differences in the composition of wealth are also examined. Some regularities 
are evident, but also country-specific differences—such as the strong preference for liquid 
savings in Japan and some other countries. Real assets, particularly land and farm assets, are 
more important in less developed countries. This reflects not only the greater importance of 
agriculture, but also an immature financial sector (that is currently being addressed in some of 
the rapidly growing developing countries) and other factors such as inflation risk. Among rich 
nations, there is significant variation in the importance of financial assets and share-holding.  
Concentration of wealth within countries is high. Gini coefficients for wealth typically lie in 
the range of about 0.6–0.8. In contrast, most Gini coefficients for disposable income fall in the 
range 0.3-0.5. The mid value for the share of the top 10 per cent of wealth-holders in our core 
country-level data is 51 per cent, again much higher than is common for income. 
The paper finds that global wealth-holding is highly concentrated, much higher than in the 
case of income. The share of the top 10 per cent of adults in 2000 is estimated to be 70.7 per 
cent and the Gini coefficient to be 0.802. The share of the bottom half is just 3.7 per cent. 
Although inter-country differences are greater than in the case of income, we find that intra-
country inequality is so much larger in the case of wealth that it accounts for a larger share of 
global inequality than it does for income, according to the Gini coefficient. Thus the principal 
                                                 
2 The present paper differs from Davies et al (2008) not only in using PPP exchange rates, but in its empirical 
framework for the estimation and imputation of wealth levels by country. This framework is set out in Section 3 of 
the present paper. The estimate of global wealth distribution provided here supersedes that in our earlier work.  
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reason for the high global inequality of wealth may be the long-recognized high inequality of 
wealth within countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes what can be 
learned about household wealth levels and composition across countries using household 
balance sheet and survey data. Section 3 presents our results on the determinants of wealth 
levels, and assigns household wealth figures to the ‘missing countries’. Section 4 reviews the 
available evidence on the pattern of wealth distribution, and then performs imputations for 
other countries. In Section 5 the data on levels and distributions are combined to construct the 
global distribution of household wealth. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
 
2 Wealth levels and composition in countries with data 
This section assembles data on wealth levels and composition for as many countries as 
possible. These data are of independent interest, but are also used in the next section to impute 
per capita wealth to countries that lack wealth data. The exercise begins by taking inventories 
of household balance sheet (HBS) and sample survey estimates of household wealth levels 
and composition.3  
2.1 Household balance sheet (HBS) data  
As indicated in Table 1, ‘complete’ financial and non-financial balance sheet data are 
available for 19 countries. These are all high-income countries, except for the Czech 
Republic, Poland, and South Africa, which are classed as upper middle-income by the World 
Bank.4 We term the data complete if they adequately cover each of financial assets, liabilities 
and non-financial assets.5 Sixteen other countries have financial balance sheets, but no 
                                                 
3 The sources and methods for balance sheet and survey data are described in Appendices I and II. 
4 The World Bank (WB) classification is used throughout the paper except that Brazil, Russia, and South Africa 
were moved from the lower middle-income category to higher middle-income, and Equatorial Guinea from low to 
lower middle-income. These changes were prompted by the fact that the WB classifications seems anomalous 
compared to the Penn World Table GDP data that was used for the year 2000. 
5 There are some national differences in asset coverage, particularly for non-financial assets. The figures for each 
country with a complete balance sheet here include both owner-occupied housing and consumer durables. There is 
some variation in coverage of other real estate. See Appendices I and II for more detail. 
4 
information on real assets. This group is less biased towards the rich world since it contains 
six upper middle income countries and three lower middle income countries. 
Regional coverage in HBS data is not representative of the world as a whole. Such data tend 
to be produced at a relatively late stage of development. Europe and North America, and the 
OECD in general, are well covered, but low-income and transition countries are not.6 In 
geographic terms this means that coverage is sparse in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the 
Caribbean. Fortunately for this study, these gaps are offset to an important extent by the 
availability of survey evidence for the largest developing countries, China, India and 
Indonesia. Also note that while there are no HBS data for Russia, complete HBS data are 
available for two European transition countries and financial data for eight others. 
The asset composition of household balance sheets in different countries, shown in Table 2, 
reflects influences such as market structure, regulation and cultural preferences (IMF 2005). 
For most countries, non-financial assets account for between 40 and 60 per cent of total 
assets, with higher shares in the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Poland, and Spain. Housing 
assets constitute a considerable share of non-financial assets. These assets include both 
owner-occupied housing and rental property.7 In a number of countries, for example Italy, 
Spain and the UK, the large increase in real estate prices in the late 1990s helps to explain the 
high share of housing. The high share of financial assets makes South Africa stand out.8 The 
USA is also an outlier in the share of financial assets, which is related to the strength of its 
financial markets and importance of private pensions but also to the strong stock market 
performance in the period leading up to the year 2000. 
The composition of financial assets can be examined not only for the 19 countries with 
complete balance sheets but also the 16 countries with only financial balance sheets. Striking 
differences across countries are evident when financial assets are disaggregated. Liquid assets 
                                                 
6 Goldsmith (1985) prepared ‘planetary’ balance sheets for 1950 and 1978 and found similar difficulties in obtaining 
representative coverage. He was able to include 15 developed market economies, two developing countries (India 
and Mexico), and the Soviet Union. This produces a total of 18 countries, one less than the number of countries for 
which we have complete HBS data for the year 2000. 
7 Only housing owned directly by households or unincorporated businesses is included here. Real estate may also be 
owned by other sectors, including the corporate sector.  
8 One would expect real assets to be important in a developing country, but the well developed financial markets in 
South Africa, combined with negative rates of return on investment in fixed property and high mortgage interest rates 
in the 1990s, resulted in an unusually low share of non-financial assets in the year 2000 (see Aron et al. 2008). 
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are a large part of the total in Japan and in most of the European transition countries. The 
preference for liquidity in Japan has a long history, but also reflects the poor performance of 
real estate and shares in the 1990s (Babeau and Sbano 2003). The share of other financial 
assets is particularly high in Australia, Austria, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the UK, 
which may be partly due to the importance of pension fund claims in these countries. Italy has 
a very low share of liabilities, a well-known phenomenon that is confirmed by survey data 
(see below). Poland and the Czech Republic also have low debt ratios, reflecting the under-
development of mortgage and consumer credit in these transition countries. 
2.2 Survey data 
In order to check the HBS data and to expand our sample, especially to non-OECD countries, 
household wealth survey data were also consulted.9 Country coverage is broader than in HBS 
data (see Table 3). Most importantly, wealth surveys are available for the three most populous 
developing/emerging market countries: China, India and Indonesia. These three countries, 
together with Mexico in the case of non-financial assets, are used in regressions in Section 3 
that provide the basis for wealth level imputations for our ‘missing countries’. 
Like all household surveys, those of wealth are affected by sampling and non-sampling errors. 
The high skewness of wealth distributions makes sampling error important. Non-sampling 
error is also a problem due to differential unit response — wealthier households are less likely 
to respond — and under-reporting, especially of financial assets. Both sampling and non-
sampling error lead to difficulties in obtaining an accurate picture of the upper tail of the 
wealth distribution (see Davies and Shorrocks 2000: 605-76, 2005). In order to offset these 
effects an increasing number of surveys over-sample wealthier households. This is the 
practice in the US Survey of Consumer Finances for example as well as in surveys in Canada, 
Germany and Spain.10 Over-sampling at the upper end has not been adopted in the major 
                                                 
9 In the next section, where we must provide a single estimate for the wealth level in each country, we use HBS data, 
where available, in preference to survey data. While HBS data are of course also subject to error, a country’s wealth 
survey results can be, and normally are, used as an input in creating HBS estimates. Since the HBS estimates benefit 
from additional inputs of information and data from other sources, they should, in principle, dominate wealth survey 
estimates. The  Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) in the USA is of such high quality, however, that it is not clear 
whether HBS or survey data should be preferred (see, for example, Bertaut and Starr-McCluer 2002: 181-218). 
Fortunately for our purposes, HBS and SCF estimates of total household wealth in the USA in 2000 are very similar 
(see below). Our results would differ little if the SCF had been used to establish the USA wealth level. 
10 The SCF design explicitly excludes people in the Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest Americans, which again helps 
to reduce the effects of sampling error; see Kennickell (2006: 19-88). 
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developing countries represented here, but these countries have much higher response rates 
than are seen in the developed countries, and China and India have large samples, helping to 
reduce sampling error.11  
Aside from the USA — whose sophisticated Survey of Consumer Finance succeeds in 
capturing most household wealth — surveys usually yield lower totals for financial assets 
compared with HBS data, principally due to the lower response rate of wealthy households 
and under-reporting by those who do respond.12 (See Appendix III for a comparison of wealth 
estimates from household balance sheets vs. surveys.) In contrast, survey totals for the most 
important non-financial asset, owner-occupied housing, are more accurate. (See Davies and 
Shorrocks, 2000, p. 630.)  
Table 3 reports asset composition in the survey data. It is clear that non-financial assets bulk 
larger in surveys than in HBS data, reflecting both the relative accuracy of housing values in 
survey data and the importance of non-sampling error in the case of financial assets. The table 
also highlights the relative importance of reported financial and non-financial assets in 
developed and developing countries. The two low-income countries in our sample, India and 
Indonesia, stand out as having particularly high shares of non-financial wealth.13 This reflects 
both the importance of land and agricultural assets and the lack of financial development. In 
India, the only low or middle income country for which the composition of financial assets is 
reported in Table 3, most of the financial assets owned by households are liquid. In Table 3, 
China does not stand out as having a high share of non-financial assets. One reason is that the 
value of housing is reported net of mortgage debt in China. Another is that there is no private 
                                                 
11 See Deaton (1995) on the high response rates to surveys in developing countries in general. As reported in Davies 
and Shorrocks (2005), response rates in the 1991-92 Indian AIDIS were 95.7 per cent and 94.6 per cent in rural and 
urban areas respectively. The sample size in the 2002 survey in China was 16,035, and in the 1991-92 survey in India 
it was 57,031.  
12 Statistical organizations fight these forms of non-sampling error through their survey technique and questionnaire 
design. Once the results are in, it is also possible to try to correct for these errors. Particularly ambitious efforts have 
been made in the Italian SHIW survey. Brandolini et al (2004) uses records of the number of contacts needed to win 
a response to estimate the differential response relationship, which allows reweighting. He also uses results of a 
validation study comparing survey responses and institutional records to correct for misreporting of selected financial 
assets. Finally, this study also imputes non-reported dwellings owned by respondents (aside from their principal 
dwelling). 
13 This echoes the findings of Goldsmith (1985) who reported that India and Mexico had an average of 65 per cent 
of national assets in tangible form in 1978, compared to 51 per cent for 14 developed market economies. 
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ownership of urban land. And of course there has been rapid accumulation of financial assets 
by Chinese households in recent years. The ratio of liabilities to total assets is particularly low 
in India and Indonesia (for China only non-housing liabilities are reported). Again poorly 
developed financial markets help to explain this phenomenon. Italy also stands out as having 
a very low share of liabilities. This low share echoes the finding in HBS data, and likely 
reflects the relative lack of mortgage loans in Italy compared to other OECD countries. 
Combining the balance sheet and survey data, it is evident that there are major international 
differences in asset composition. Real property, particularly land and farm assets, are more 
important in less developed countries, while financial assets are more important in rich 
countries. There are also major international differences in the types of financial assets 
owned. Savings accounts are favoured in transition economies and some rich Asian countries, 
while share-holdings and other types of financial assets are more evident in rich Western 
countries. Debt is also less important in developing and transition countries than in the more 
developed countries (with the notable exception of Italy). 
2.3 Wealth levels from household balance sheet and survey data 
When wealth levels are compared across countries, one of the first issues to be confronted is 
the appropriate rate of exchange between currencies. In comparisons of consumption or 
income there is widespread agreement that international price differences should be taken into 
account via the use of PPP exchange rates.14 This procedure seems appropriate for wealth 
holdings also if the focus of attention is, say, the bottom 95 per cent of wealth-holders, for 
whom domestic prices are the main determinant of the real value of their assets. However, a 
large share of wealth is held by households in the top few percentiles of the distribution. 
People in this category, and their financial assets, tend to be internationally mobile, making 
exchange rates more relevant for international wealth comparisons among the rich and super-
rich. 
This paper follows the convention of using PPP exchange rates to compare countries; unless 
otherwise stated, all wealth figures are expressed in PPP US dollars for the year 2000. 
                                                 
14 There is, however, some disagreement about the type of PPP exchange rates that should be used. We follow 
common practice and use the Penn World Table PPP rates, which are based on the Geary-Khamis method. This 
method has many practical advantages, including desirable adding-up properties. The leading competitor is the 
method proposed by Elteto, Koves and Szulc (EKS), which has been used by the OECD and Eurostat to compare 
income across their member countries. See Neary (2004) for a discussion of the theoretical basis for the Geary-
Khamis method. 
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Selected comparable figures on an exchange rate basis are presented in footnotes and 
appendices. They are also discussed in detail in Davies et al. (2008) which places more 
emphasis on the upper tail of the distribution. 
Table 4 summarizes information on the per capita wealth and income of countries with 
complete household balance sheet or wealth survey data (data for individual countries are 
given in Appendix III). Of the 19 countries that have complete HBS data, the USA ranks first 
with per capita wealth of $143,727 in 2000, followed by the UK at $128,959, Japan at 
$124,858, the Netherlands at $121,165, Italy at $120,897, and then Singapore at $113,631. 
South Africa is in last place, at $16,266, preceded by Poland at $24,654, and the Czech 
Republic at $32,431. The overall range is rather large, with per capita wealth in the USA 8.8 
times as great as that of South Africa. The (unweighted) coefficient of variation (CV) among 
the 19 countries is 0.440. 
The next column shows GDP per capita. In the group of 19 countries with HBS data, the USA 
again ranks first, at $35,619, and South Africa last, at $8,017. However, the range is much 
smaller than for net worth per capita. The ratio of highest to lowest GDP per capita is only 
4.4, and the coefficient of variation (again among the 19 countries) is 0.301. These results are 
a first indication, which our full results confirm, that wealth is more unequally distributed 
across countries than is income. Note that while it is well-known that wealth is more unequal 
than income within countries, that common observation does not imply anything about 
differences across countries. Column four shows personal disposable income per capita for 
the same group of countries. The USA again ranks first, at $25,480, South Africa is again last, 
at $4,691, and the ratio of highest to lowest is 5.4, slightly higher than for GDP per capita. 
The coefficient of variation is 0.331, again slightly higher than that of GDP per capita. The 
fifth column shows real consumption per capita, whose dispersion is intermediate between 
that of GDP and disposable income. All in all, the per capita variation of net worth is much 
greater than that of GDP, disposable income or consumption. 
Differences across countries are even more pronounced in survey data due to the inclusion of 
China, India, and Indonesia. Of the 13 countries with the pertinent data, the USA again ranks 
first in net worth per capita, at $143,857, followed by Australia at $101,597, and Japan at 
$91,856. In this group, India and Indonesia occupy the bottom two positions, at $6,513 and 
$7,973, respectively. China appears to be about twice as wealthy as India, having per capita 
net worth of $11,267. Note that the PPP adjustment has a proportionately greater impact on 
the figures for developing countries. Using official exchange rates, all three countries have 
much lower per capita wealth: India is at $1,112, Indonesia at $1,440, and China at $2,613. 
Hence inequality in wealth between countries is greater using official exchange rates, as 
reflected in the CV of 0.612 shown in the table versus 0.440 on a PPP basis. In the survey 
9 
data, as in the HBS data, the range in per capita wealth is much larger than that of per capita 
GDP, disposable income, or consumption. The ratio of highest to lowest is 22 for wealth per 
capita, 13 for both GDP and disposable income, and 17 for consumption. The coefficients of 
variation for the income and consumption variables are again smaller than for wealth, and 
higher using official exchange rates than PPP rates. 
How large are the differences in the picture that one gets from HBS vs. survey data? There are 
10 countries that have both types of data. For these countries the (simple) average of mean per 
capita PPP wealth is $98,364 in HBS data and $74,579 in survey data, a difference of 24 per 
cent. (The difference is 25 per cent using official exchange rates.) The correlation between 
HBS and survey means is just 0.62 on the PPP basis, although it rises to 0.83, using official 
exchange rates. The difference in means and the imperfect correlation are, we believe, largely 
a result of the uneven quality of survey evidence across countries. Given the latter, it seems 
clear that an approach in which one simply aggregated national survey data to estimate the 
world distribution of wealth would be inadequate. Since more consistent information is 
available, in the form of HBS data, in establishing wealth levels by country the latter should 
be used as far as possible. That is the approach followed in estimating the global distribution 
of wealth later in this paper.  
 
3 Estimates of wealth levels and composition for all countries 
The next step is to generate per capita wealth values for the remaining countries of the world. 
As explained below, regressions run on the 39 countries with HBS or survey data enable part 
or all of wealth to be estimated for many countries. This yields a total of 148 countries with 
observed or estimated wealth, covering 95.2 per cent of the world’s population in 2000. 
Separate imputations are made for the 81 countries that make up the remaining 4.8%, as 
explained later in this section. 
The purpose of the empirical exercise reported in this section is to predict wealth levels in 
countries where wealth data are missing. This imposes certain limitations. Most importantly, 
the independent variables in our regressions need to be available not only for the countries 
with wealth data, but also for most of those without such data—otherwise we would not be 
able to impute wealth to the “missing countries”. Fortunately, this limitation does not prevent 
us from estimating a sensible empirical model of personal wealth levels across countries. 
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3.1 Empirical specification  
The basic life-cycle model (LCM) under certainty and perfect capital markets, and without 
government, provides a useful starting point for our empirical model.15 Suppose that 
intertemporal preferences, and the ages of starting work and retiring were the same 
everywhere, but that length of life, L, varied internationally. Assume also that the real interest 
rate r was zero and that growth rates of both labour income and population, g and p 
respectively, were constant but differed across countries. For simplicity assume that workers 
are all employed full-time and have exogenous earnings. Then, mean wealth would be 
determined by g, p, L, and mean earnings, y. In steady-state we would have: 
(1)   W  =  f (g, p, L) y 
(See Brumberg and Modigliani, 1980, or Modigliani 1988.) A strong prediction of the LCM is 
that L will have a positive effect here. The growth rates g and p have a mild negative effect in 
the simple LCM.16 The model can be extended to a world with government by redefining r 
and y as net of taxes and transfers.  
While (1) takes us some way, it does not provide the entire basis for an empirical 
specification. Ideally one should take into account international differences in the age of 
retirement, for example. This is unfortunately impractical since the data are not available on a 
consistent basis for enough countries. But what of the role of the interest rate and that of 
public pensions? The impact of r in the LCM is complex and ambiguous. Also, empirical 
work finds conflicting, and often insignificant, impacts (Modigliani, 1988). Since we also do 
not have good data on r for a large set of countries we do not attempt to include it in our 
                                                 
15 As far as we know, there have been no previous regression-based studies of the determinants of international 
wealth differences. Part of the original motivation for the LCM was to explain international differences in saving and 
wealth (see e.g. Deaton 2005). Results for international differences in saving have been mixed, but the life-cycle 
framework has proven useful in studying saving at the micro level (see Browning and Crossley, 2001) and wealth 
distribution in macroeconomics (see Cagetti and De Nardi, 2008). The LCM is fruitful in the present application in 
part because one of its central predictions, that wealth should increase with longevity (assuming this translates into 
longer retirements), holds here statistically. 
16 Steady-state saving will increase with both g and p, but the wealth to income ratio (W/y) tends to decline mildly 
with g and p. The reason is that there is, for the most part, a positive relationship between wealth and age in the LCM 
(the working period of rising wealth is longer than retirement, and also early retirees have relatively high wealth). 
Higher p increases the relative number of young people, reducing W/y. Higher g increases both the relative wealth 
and labour income of the young, but the effect of this on average income tends to be stronger than that on mean 
wealth, so again W/y tends to fall.  
11 
regressions. Pensions are a different matter. In the simplest version of the LCM, where 
consumption is constant over the lifetime and r = g = p = 0, y can be replaced in (1) by y – b, 
where y is net of pension contributions and b is the (constant) pension received in retirement. 
Public pensions thus have a direct negative effect on private wealth. However, in more 
complex versions of the LCM, and especially if impacts on age of retirement are taken into 
account, the effect of public pensions becomes ambiguous. (See e.g. Gale, 1998.) 
Nevertheless, although the evidence is mixed, several good empirical studies suggest a 
significant effect of pensions on wealth within a country.17 We tested for a similar effect 
internationally in the work reported below, but no significant impact was found.  
It must also be recognized that the steady-state assumption is a poor approximation in some 
cases, for example transition countries. Further, capital and other markets are not perfect. 
Access to financial institutions and products varies across countries, as do housing market 
institutions and the ease of mortgage finance. While (1) may provide a preliminary basis for 
our work, these additional effects also need to be taken into account. We do this by 
introducing a dummy variable for transition countries and introducing variables that may 
reflect relevant capital market differences, as discussed below. 
One approach here would be to simply regress log W on the “LCM variables” shown on the 
right-hand side of (1), with some allowance for transition countries and capital market 
imperfections. We can do that for the 23 countries that have data on both financial and real 
wealth. However, there is one country (Mexico) with data on real assets alone and 15 
countries with good data on financial assets and liabilities. It would be unfortunate to exclude 
these countries, especially since they include a higher proportion of transition and middle-
income countries. This raises the possibility of running separate regressions for real vs. 
financial wealth. How does that square with the framework we have been developing? 
The simple LCM is silent on the division of wealth between different kinds of assets.18 A 
naïve hypothesis would be that the various assets would be held in the same proportion in 
different countries. In this world one could run separate regressions for different asset groups, 
but there would be no benefit since each regression would estimate the same coefficients 
except for scale. And there could be a cost if measurement error in the dependent variable 
                                                 
17 See Gale (1998) for a summary, as well as Bottazzi et al. (2006) and Gale et al. (2007) on more recent work. 
18 If current income is low people may be net borrowers in the LCM, which implies holding some debt. This is the 
only prediction from the LCM regarding wealth composition, and even this prediction does not say much, since those 
with negative net worth could have assets as well as debts, so that their net borrowing may differ from their debt.  
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declines in importance with aggregation, as seems likely here. We ran separate regressions on 
real assets, financial assets, and liabilities using the same variables and found that the 
hypothesis of a common structure was, in fact, strongly rejected. Further, as we see below, 
there are grounds for introducing non-common variables in these regressions and they 
perform well empirically. In this situation, as shown by Kennan (1989), there would be 
aggregation bias if a single equation were run for W. And since this cannot be done for the full 
sample of 39 countries in any case, our preferred approach is to run three separate regressions. 
To give a behavioural basis to the three equations approach one must move beyond the simple 
LCM and think about differences in asset characteristics, including risk and return. There is a 
literature on optimal portfolio selection in a life-cycle context. It finds that the intuitive idea 
that people should hold a less risky portfolio as they age is correct, at least beyond the middle 
working years, under plausible assumptions. (See Benzoni et al., 2007, and Gomes et al., 
2008.) Here that might suggest, e.g., that countries with higher population growth should have 
a higher ratio of financial to non-financial assets, assuming that financial assets are riskier.19 
The amount that people will save depends on the menu of risks and returns on different assets. 
One cannot generally decompose savings decisions into an “LCM decision” of how much to 
save and a portfolio allocation decision. This indicates that in a more general version of the 
LCM risk elements would affect mean wealth. 
One of the most important personal assets, housing, is held for consumption as well as 
investment purposes. With perfect markets this need not affect mean wealth. Households can 
rent, or borrow freely to keep housing equity in line with life-cycle saving plans. However, in 
the real-world mortgage finance is not so flexible, and tax or other institutions may favour 
owner-occupation. In this context, impacts on mean wealth can come from the housing 
market. For example, if the consumption demand for housing is inelastic, mean wealth may 
tend to be higher where housing is more expensive.  
Because errors in our three equations are likely to be correlated, we use the seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) technique due to Zellner (1962) (see Greene 1993: 486-99). This 
involves stacking equations and estimating via generalized least squares. While OLS 
estimates are consistent, SUR provides greater efficiency, with the gain in efficiency 
increasing with the correlation of the errors across the equations, and decreasing with the 
                                                 
19 Benzoni et al. (2007) emphasize that the optimal share of risky assets is hump-shaped over the life-cycle when 
cointegration of labor and stock returns is recognized. Whether a fast growing country would have a higher overall 
ratio of risky assets in their model therefore depends on the shape and peak age of this hump. 
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correlation of the regressors used in the different equations. Since we have an equal number 
of observations for financial assets and liabilities, but fewer observations for non-financial 
assets, and since we believe errors are more likely to be correlated between financial assets 
and liabilities than between the latter variables and non-financial assets, we have applied SUR 
here only for financial assets and liabilities.  
3.2 Wealth Regressions 
Table 5 shows our main regression results. For comparison we show single-equation 
regressions for log W as well as our three equations for asset subgroups. In each case we show 
the preliminary specification (a) and the final specification (b). The two specifications mainly 
differ in that variables that were insignificant in (a) are not used in (b). However, in a few 
cases variables that were insignificant in (a) become significant when other insignificant 
variables are omitted, and are retained in the (b) regressions. 
Our first four regressors try to capture the four LCM variables y, L, g and p.20 We initially 
used personal disposable income per capita for y, and it performs well. However, this variable 
is not available for many of our “missing countries”, and so cannot be used to perform the 
intended imputations. In Table 5 we therefore report results using real per capita 
consumption21 to play the role of y — it is highly correlated with y in-sample and its use has 
only a small impact on the estimated coefficients. This variable is significant at the 1% level 
in all our equations. Interestingly, while the estimated coefficients are insignificantly different 
from unity in most cases, for non-financial assets the coefficient is significantly less than 1. 
The coefficient is very close to 1 for financial assets, and equals 1.199 for liabilities. These 
aspects are important, since in our imputations financial assets will increase roughly in 
proportion to income, but non-financial assets will rise less, and liabilities slightly more than 
in proportion to income.  
                                                 
20 Various specifications were tried for public pensions, including the replacement of y by y – b in line with the 
simple LCM. The y – b variable performed distinctly worse than y alone. When pension variables were introduced 
independently they were insignificant in all our equations. (This may be partly explained by the fact that the variable 
was not available for many of the low and middle income countries in our sample.) Given these findings, we do not 
report regressions including a public pension variable here.  
21 Real consumption per capita is from Penn World Tables 6.1 and is based on National Accounts (NA) data. NA 
consumption data measure most forms of consumption on the basis of current purchases. An important exception is 
housing consumption, which is measured by the value of housing services consumed. This means that the item 
includes rents or, in case of home owners, imputed rents. See Commission of the European Communities et al., Ch. 
IX, section D.  
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For L we use life expectancy in 1980, attempting to capture conditions when the average adult 
of 2000 was in the middle of working life and forming expectations about his/her likely 
length of life and retirement.22 This variable is highly significant for total wealth and for non-
financial assets. It is also significant at the 5% level for both financial assets and liabilities.23 
The growth rates g and p are each significant in just one of the (b) specification regressions in 
Table 5. Per capita GDP growth is retained in the financial assets regression, but while 
population growth is significant for total wealth, it is not retained in the (b) specification of 
any of the three asset-specific equations. This general lack of significance may reflect the fact 
that, as mentioned earlier, the impact of these variables on W/y is expected to be mild on the 
basis of the LCM. 
Turning to the additional variables, we used the (log of) population density as a proxy for 
house prices, expecting a positive impact on non-financial assets, which is indeed found. (The 
variable is also highly significant for total wealth.) Significant positive effects are found for 
the market capitalization rate in the financial assets regression, and domestic credits available 
to the private sector in the liabilities regression (both again in logs). These effects are 
consistent with better functioning of capital markets leading to their greater use. The 
urbanization (% urban) and phone participation (% with phones) variables were included as 
they could affect ease of access to financial products. These variables were expected to have 
positive effects on both financial assets and liabilities. This expectation was correct for 
liabilities, but not for financial assets. 
Finally, we have two dummies—one for cases where the data source is a survey rather than 
HBS data, and the other for transition countries. The survey dummy is only significant in the 
financial assets regression, but there it is highly significant and also has a large negative 
coefficient. This means that if the data source is a survey, mean financial assets will tend to be 
much lower than if the data are from national balance sheets. We use this result to adjust 
upwards the estimates of mean financial assets in both the wealth levels and distributional 
calculations reported below for China, India and Indonesia. The transition dummy has a 
highly significant, but smaller, negative impact on non-financial wealth and total wealth. In 
contrast to the survey dummy, we believe the transition dummy is telling us something about 
                                                 
22 Using 1980 rather than a more recent year for L also avoids the distortion in this variable caused in recent years by 
the AIDS epidemic, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries.  
23 Note the negative sign for liabilities, suggesting that higher mean wealth occurs partly through greater assets and 
partly through lower debts. 
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the real-world—that the values of non-financial assets in transition countries are depressed, 
perhaps due to incomplete housing markets and under-developed housing finance. 
3.3 Estimated wealth levels 
Table 6 summarizes the wealth levels obtained for the world and its regions. HBS data are 
used where available (see Table 1); corrected survey data are used for China, India and 
Indonesia. Financial assets and liabilities are imputed for 110 countries, and non-financial 
assets for 125 countries, using the regressions described in the previous section. For the 81 
countries that lack any data, the mean per capita wealth of the appropriate continental region 
(6 categories) and income class (4 categories)24 were assigned. This imputation is admittedly 
crude, but better than simply disregarding the excluded countries. It allows us, in the end, to 
assign wealth levels to 229 countries. 
Table 6 provides both per capita and per adult numbers, each weighted by their respective 
population weight.25 For the world as whole in 2000, net worth was estimated to be $26,738 
per capita and $44,024 per adult. North America accounted for 27 per cent of world 
household wealth, much more than its 5 per cent share of world population and greater than 
its 24 per cent share of world GDP. The ‘rich Asia-Pacific’ group and Europe show a similar 
pattern, with wealth shares much greater than their population shares and larger than their 
shares of world GDP.26 Given these results, it is not surprising to see that between-country 
inequality, as shown by the Gini coefficient, is higher for wealth than GDP (0.583 vs. 0.503 
respectively on a per capita basis). Note also that between-country wealth inequality is lower 
using the per adult basis (which gives a Gini coefficient of 0.533), reflecting the fact that the 
difference between wealth per capita and per adult is greater in poor countries, which have a 
higher proportion of children in their populations. 
                                                 
24 Our regional calculations treat China and India separately due to the size of their populations. In the regional 
breakdowns it was also convenient to distinguish the high income subset of countries in the Asia-Pacific region (a list 
which includes Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and several Middle Eastern states) from the 
remaining (mainly low-income) nations. 
25 While per capita magnitudes are more familiar, we argue in the next section that it is best to analyze the world 
wealth distribution among adults rather than all individuals. It is therefore helpful to begin looking at per adult, as 
well as per capita, figures at this point. 
26 Note that the disproportion between wealth and population shares, although large, is less for Europe than the other 
high wealth regions. This reflects in part the inclusion of the lower wealth countries of Eastern Europe. 
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The rich Asia-Pacific group includes Hong Kong, which has the highest mean wealth in the 
world on per capita basis and the second highest on a per adult basis according to our 
estimates—$175,191 per capita and $228,675 per adult, or 5.2 times the world average per 
adult (see Appendix VI as well as Table 6). This group also includes Japan and Singapore, 
both at 3.6 times the world average per adult. Europe contains both very high wealth 
countries, such as Luxembourg (the first place country per adult, as Hong Kong also with 
wealth 5.7 times the world average), the UK (3.9 times the world average), and the 
Netherlands and Italy (3.6 and 3.4 times the world average respectively), as well as low 
wealth countries such as Moldova (29 per cent of the world average), the Ukraine (43 per 
cent), and Albania (47 per cent). 
Lower down the scale, China and India collectively accounted for 37 per cent of world 
population in the year 2000, but only 16 per cent of world GDP and 14 per cent of the global 
wealth. China’s net worth per adult was $19,056 (43 per cent of the world average) and 
India’s was $12,021 (27 per cent). Latin American and the Caribbean had 9 per cent of the 
world’s population and GDP, but 6 per cent of world wealth. Among this group, the 
wealthiest countries include Barbados (3.4 times the world average per adult), Puerto Rico 
(2.8 times), and Trinidad and Tobago (2.1 times). The less affluent countries in this group 
include Haiti (18 per cent of the world average), Bolivia (19 per cent) and Honduras (27 per 
cent). 
Africa and ‘other Asia-Pacific’ countries together accounted for 33 per cent of the world 
population but only 14 per cent of world GDP and 9 per cent of global wealth. Almost all 
countries in the other Asia-Pacific group have net worth per adult below the world average, 
except for Lebanon positioning itself just above the mean. Yemen (5 per cent) and Cambodia 
(10 per cent) are the least wealthy countries in this group. With the notable exception of 
Mauritius and the Seychelles (2.4 and 1.1 times the world average per adult), the African 
nations are all below average in per capita wealth and include South Africa (66 per cent of the 
world average), Zimbabwe (39 per cent), Kenya (22 per cent), Uganda (13 per cent), Tanzania 
(5 per cent), and Nigeria (3 per cent). 
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4 Wealth distribution within countries  
In order to estimate the global distribution of wealth we need estimates of the distribution 
within countries.  We start by assembling estimates for countries with hard data.  We then 
perform imputations for the remaining  countries.  The resulting estimates are intended mainly 
as an input into our global calculations but also have some independent interest, as we bring 
out in the discussion.27   
As indicated in Table 7, information on the distribution of wealth across households or 
individuals can be assembled for 20 countries. One set of figures was selected for each nation, 
with a preference for the year 2000, ceteris paribus. In most countries there is only one 
suitable data source. Where there was a choice we assessed sources in terms of how 
comprehensive their population and asset coverage were, the unit used (adults being preferred 
to families or households), and how well they dealt with sampling error, particularly as it 
affects the upper tail.28 To assist comparability across countries, a common distribution 
template was adopted, consisting of the decile shares reported in the form of cumulated 
quantile shares (i.e. Lorenz curve ordinates) plus the shares of the top 10 per cent, 5 per cent, 
2 per cent, 1 per cent, 0.5 per cent and 0.1 per cent. 
The data differ in various respects. The economic unit of analysis is most often a household or 
family, but in one case (China) the unit is individuals—of any age, and for France and the UK 
it is an adult individual.29 Distribution information is usually reported for the share of wealth 
                                                 
27 Country-level wealth inequality statistics could potentially be used as regressors in studies e.g. of economic 
growth or political stability.  They may also be useful in the assessment of the success of financial systems and 
public policies to encourage personal wealth.  However, we would hope that researchers will show appropriate 
restraint in their use of our country-level estimates where they are imputed rather than based on hard data.     
28 In the USA for example, we have used the SCF, which is purpose-designed to estimate the distribution of wealth. 
It has comprehensive asset and population coverage and a sophisticated strategy for dealing with the upper tail. 
Estate-tax based estimates are also good in the upper tail, but are subject to a range of possible biases and do not 
cover the middle or bottom of the distribution (Kopczuk and Saez, 2004). The PSID collects wealth data, but it 
cannot compete with the SCF in estimating the overall distribution of wealth especially since there is no 
oversampling of the upper tail (Juster and Smith, 1999). The situation in the U.K. and Germany is somewhat similar, 
both having panel studies (BHPS and SOEP respectively—see Sierminska et al., 2006) with similar limitations to the 
PSID. For the U.K. we use estate-multiplier data, which is good in the upper tail and is on a per-adult basis. For 
Germany we have used the EVS survey conducted by the federal statistical office. The EVS has a large sample, 
strong weighting procedures, and detailed asset coverage (Hauser and Stein, 2006)  
29New Zealand uses the “economic unit”, defined as an unpartnered adult or a couple. This is effectively a narrowly 
defined family. A “family” includes a group of people living together who are related by blood or marriage. A 
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owned by each decile, together with the share of the top 5 per cent and the top 1 per cent of 
wealth-holders. But this pattern is far from universal. In some instances information on 
quantile shares is very sparse. On other occasions, wealth shares are reported for the top 0.5 
per cent or even the top 0.1 per cent in the cases of Denmark, France, Spain, and Switzerland. 
The most important respect in which the data vary across countries is the manner by which 
the information is collected. Household sample surveys are employed in 15 of the 20 
countries.30 Survey results are affected by sampling and non-sampling error, as discussed 
earlier. Non-sampling error tends to reduce estimates of inequality and the shares of the top 
groups because wealthy households are less likely to respond, and because under-reporting is 
particularly severe for the kinds of financial assets that are especially important for the 
wealthy—for example, equities and bonds. 
Other wealth distribution estimates derive from tax records. The French and UK data are 
based on estate tax returns, while the data for Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland originate 
from wealth tax records. These data sources have the advantage that ‘response’ is involuntary, 
and under-reporting is illegal. However, under-reporting may occur nonetheless, and there are 
valuation problems that produce analogous results. 
Wealth tax regulations may assign to some assets a fraction of their market value, and omit 
other assets altogether. There are also evident differences in the way that debts are 
investigated and recorded. For most countries the bottom decile of wealth-holders is reported 
as having positive net wealth, but in Sweden the bottom three deciles each have negative net 
worth and in Denmark this is true for the bottom four deciles.31 
                                                                                                                                                        
“household” is a broader concept, including a group of people sharing a common dwelling unit. Definitions differ 
slightly across countries and may be operationalized in different ways.  
30 The list of countries differs a little from that used in Sections 2 and 3. Here the desire is to exploit distributional 
information for as many countries as possible, so countries with data considerably earlier than 2000 were added: 
Ireland (for 1987) and Korea (for 1988). In the absence of any better alternatives for these two countries, we take the 
shape of the wealth distribution from the late 1980s to be a guide for the wealth distribution in year 2000. Sweden 
was also added since its distributional detail is of interest, although the mean from this source was not judged 
sufficiently reliable to be used in our estimates of wealth levels. The Netherlands was dropped due to insufficient 
distributional detail. 
31 Klevmarken (2006: 276-94) identifies a number of factors that helped to account for negative wealth shares of 
Swedish households in the tax register data in the 1990s, and may still have been operative in 2002. These include 
student loan debt, the inclusion of debt incurred to buy assets that are not covered in the data (mainly consumer 
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Table 7 shows that estimated wealth concentration varies significantly across countries but is 
generally very high. Comparisons of wealth inequality often focus attention on the share of 
the top 1 per cent. That statistic is reported for 11 countries, a list that excludes China, 
Germany, and the Nordic countries apart from Denmark. Estimated shares of the top 1 per 
cent range from 10.4 per cent in Ireland to 34.8 per cent in Switzerland, with the USA 
towards the top end of this range at 32.7 per cent.32 The share of the top 10 per cent, which is 
available for all 20 countries, ranges from 39.3 per cent in Japan to 76.4 per cent in Denmark. 
The differences in wealth concentration across countries in Table 7 are attributable in part to 
differences in data quality. In the case of survey data it is important to over-sample in the 
upper tail to get the best possible estimates of top wealth shares.  However, this is done in a 
minority of cases - -just Canada, Germany, Spain and the USA in the data used here.  In the 
absence of oversampling in the upper tail, Davies (1993) concludes on the basis of evidence 
for Canada and the USA that the share of the top 1 per cent may be under-estimated by about 
5 - 10 percentage points. (See Davies, 1993, pp. 168-171 and p.176.) The surprisingly low top 
shares seen here in some countries, for example Ireland, may reflect this phenomenon.33  
                                                                                                                                                        
durables) and a household definition in which young adults living at home with their parents, as well as unmarried 
cohabiting adults, were counted as separate households. 
32 The sampling frame for the USA survey excludes the Forbes 400 richest families; adding them would raise the 
share of the top 1 per cent by about two percentage points; see Kennickell (2006: 20). Note also that this estimated 
share is higher than that found in estate-multiplier data for the USA. See Kopczuk and Saez (2004) who report a 
share of the top 1% of adults in the USA in the year 2000 of 20.8% using estate-tax data. There are differences in 
asset coverage between the SCF and the estate-multiplier estimates, as well as problems of tax evasion and avoidance 
in the estate-tax data. In addition the SCF uses a family rather than adult unit. As discussed by Kopczuk and Saez, it 
is widely believed that the SCF provides a better snapshot of the distribution of wealth than the estate-multiplier data 
at a point in time. However, the estate-multiplier data, which go back to 1916, have no rival in attempts to trace the 
evolution of the USA wealth distribution over long spans of time.  
33 Low top shares are also seen in some of the data we have rejected for countries with multiple sources. Shares of 
the top 10% of 45% and 64% are seen in the UK’s BHPS for 2000 and the PSID (USA) for 2001 respectively 
(Sierminska et al., 2006, Table 9), figures that are both lower than the estimates seen in our Table 7. Neither the 
BHPS nor the PSID over-samples the upper tail, whereas Table 7 shows estate-tax based data for the UK, which do 
not have a sampling problem in the upper tail, and SCF data for the USA, which over-sample the upper tail carefully. 
The German SOEP for 2002 shows higher top shares than the EVS used in our Table 7 but the SOEP results are 
distorted by the fact that most financial assets and non-housing debt are only recorded for values exceeding 2,500 
euros, which exaggerates inequality (see Sierminska et al., 2006 again). 
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As evident from Table 7, the available sources provide a patchwork of quantile shares. In 
order to move towards an estimate of the world distribution of wealth, more complete and 
comparable information is needed on the distribution in each country. To achieve this, 
missing cell values were imputed using a programme developed at UNU-WIDER which 
constructs a synthetic sample of 1000 observations that conforms exactly with any valid set of 
quantile shares derived from a distribution of positive values (e.g., incomes) (see Shorrocks 
and Wan 2008.)34 To apply this ‘ungrouping’ programme, the negative wealth shares reported 
for Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Sweden were discarded, together with the zero shares 
reported elsewhere, thus treating the cell values as missing observations. 
The 20 countries for which wealth distribution data are available include China and India, and 
hence cover a good proportion of the world population. They also include most of the large 
rich countries, and therefore cover most global wealth. However, the fact that the list is 
dominated by OECD members cautions against extrapolating immediately to the rest of the 
world. 
For most countries lacking direct wealth distribution data, the pattern of wealth distribution 
was estimated using income distribution data recorded in the WIID dataset, on the grounds 
that wealth inequality is likely to be correlated—possibly highly correlated—with income 
inequality across countries. The WIID dataset covers 144 countries and has multiple 
observations for most of them. Where possible, data was chosen for household income per 
capita across individuals for a year close to 2000, with first priority given to figures on 
disposable income, then consumption or expenditure. Eighty-five per cent of the income 
distributions conform to these criteria. Figures for gross incomes added a further seven per 
cent, leaving a residual eight per cent of countries for which the choices were very limited. 
The ‘ungrouping’ programme was then used to generate quantile shares for income (reported 
in Lorenz curve form) according to the same template employed for wealth distribution. 
The common template applied to the wealth and income distributions allows Lorenz curve 
comparisons for each of the 20 reference countries listed in Table 7. In every instance, wealth 
                                                 
34 The first stage of the procedure fits a Lognormal distribution to the reported data and generates an equal- 
weighted synthetic sample of 1000 observations which is approximately consistent with the recorded quantile shares. 
The second stage adjusts the values of the observations within each quantile until the quantile shares for the synthetic 
sample exactly match the true figures. Although other theoretical functional forms tend to provide a better initial fit to 
wealth distributions, particularly in the upper tail, the second stage ‘stretching’ procedure improves the accuracy of 
the Lognormal-based sample so much that the outcome is as good as, if not better than, the usual alternatives. 
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shares are lower than income shares at each point of the Lorenz curve: in other words, wealth 
is unambiguously more unequally distributed than income. Furthermore, the ratios of wealth 
shares to income shares at a given percentile are roughly similar across countries, suggesting 
that income inequality can be used to generate an imputation for wealth inequality when 
wealth distribution data are not available. Thus, in our imputations, the ratio of the Lorenz 
ordinates for wealth compared to income is taken to be constant across countries. These 
constant ratios (14 in total) correspond to the average value recorded for the 20 reference 
countries.35 This generates estimates of wealth distribution for 124 countries to add to the 20 
original countries which have direct evidence of wealth inequality. 
The group of 144 countries with actual or estimated wealth distribution data differs slightly 
from the group of 150 nations which have figures for mean wealth derived from actual data or 
the regressions of Section 3. Distributional evidence is more common for populous countries, 
so the group of 144 now includes Cuba, Iraq, Myanmar, Nepal, Serbia, Sudan, and 
Uzbekistan, and covers 96.6 per cent of the global population. For the rest of the world not 
covered by WIID data, the default of disregarding the remaining countries was again 
eschewed in favour of imputing a wealth distribution pattern equal to the (population 
weighted) average for the corresponding region and income class. 
 
5 World distribution 
In this section we present our estimate of the global distribution of wealth on a PPP basis. 
Subsequently we test the sensitivity of this estimate to the use of PPP rather than official 
exchange rates, and to the use of imputed data. The latter exercise allows us to present an 
estimate of the distribution of wealth for just the 20 countries, with 59% of the world’s adult 
population, that have hard data. First, however, we consider the choice of unit to be used in 
these exercises.  
The interpretation of data on personal wealth distribution depends on the underlying 
population deemed to be relevant. Are we interested in the distribution of wealth across all 
individuals, adult persons, or households or families?36 When examining the analogous issue 
                                                 
35 To circumvent aggregation problems, the adjustment ratio was applied to the cumulated income shares (i.e. 
Lorenz values) rather than separate quantile income shares. 
36 Note that each of these bases was used by at least one country listed in Table 6. 
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of global income distribution, it is common practice to assume (as a first approximation) that 
the benefits of household expenditure are shared equally among household members, and that 
each person should be weighted equally in the overall distribution. However, the situation 
with wealth is rather different. Personal assets and debts are typically owned by named 
individuals, and may well be retained by those individuals if they leave the family. 
Furthermore, while some household assets, especially housing, provide a stream of communal 
benefits, it is highly unlikely that control of assets is shared equally by household members or 
that household members will share equally in the proceeds if the asset is sold. Membership of 
households can be quite fluid (for example, with respect to children living away from home) 
and the pattern of household structure varies markedly across countries. These aspects all 
argue for the use of an individual unit rather than the household or family. There is an 
additional, practical, reason for not using households, which is that the number of households 
is unknown for most countries, whereas adult population data are readily available. Finally, 
those under about 20 years of age have little formal or actual wealth ownership, and should 
therefore likely be set aside. Thus, despite the fact that most of the datasets listed in Table 7 
are constructed on a family or household basis, our goal is to estimate the distribution of 
global wealth on a per-adult basis. 
In estimating the global distribution we assume, in effect, that the shape of the adult 
distribution of wealth at country level is the same as that of a family- or household-based 
distribution. Adult and household distributions would indeed have the same shape if children 
held insignificant assets, the number of adults per household did not vary systematically with 
wealth, and wealth were equally divided among adults in a household. Children do have little 
wealth. However, wealthier households on average have more adults, and although there has 
been a trend towards more equal division of assets within marriage, equal division is not 
universal. Studies have looked at what happens when, starting with adult data, one “pairs up” 
a portion of adults into couples and measures inequality on a family basis. This reduces 
inequality among married people, but increases measured inequality between singles and 
couples. The effects are to an extent offsetting, but the net effect is to reduce measured 
inequality somewhat.37 This impact should be borne in mind in interpreting our estimate of 
global wealth inequality.  
                                                 
37 Wolff and Marley (1989) compared the share of wealth held by the top one percent of adults in USA estate-
multiplier data with a lower-bound estimate of the share held by the top one percent of families, derived from the 
estate-multiplier data via assortative mating assumptions. As reported by Wolff (2002, p. 82), they found a share for 
the top 1% of adults of 19.1% vs. 12.7% for families in 1976. Atkinson and Harrison (1978, p. 248) found a smaller 
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5.1 Global Distribution 
In order to get an estimate of the global distribution of wealth the national wealth levels 
derived in Section 3 were combined with the wealth distribution data derived in Section 4. 
Specifically, the ungrouping programme was applied to each country to generate a sample of 
1,000 synthetic individual observations consistent with the (actual, estimated or imputed) 
wealth distribution. These were scaled up by mean wealth, weighted by the adult population 
size of the respective country, and merged into a single dataset comprising over 200,000 
observations.38 The complete sample was then processed to obtain the minimum wealth and 
the wealth share of each percentile in the global distribution of wealth. The procedure also 
provides estimates of the composition by country of each wealth percentile, although these are 
rough estimates given that the population of each country is condensed into a sample of 
1,000, so that a single sample observation for China or India represents more than half a 
million adults. 
Tables 8 and 9 summarize our estimates of the distribution of wealth across the global 
population of 3.7 billion adults. Only $8,635 was needed in order to belong to the top half of 
the world wealth distribution in the year 2000; but to be a member of the top 10 per cent 
required at least $89,569 and membership of the top 1 per cent required more than $518,364 
per adult. This latter figure is surprisingly high, given that the top 1 per cent group contains 
37 million adults and is therefore far from an exclusive club. The entrance fee has no doubt 
grown higher still in the period since the year 2000. The figures for wealth shares show that 
the top 10 per cent of adults owned 70.7 per cent of global household wealth, so that the 
typical member of this group had 7.1 times the average global holding. The corresponding 
figures for the top 5 per cent and top 1 per cent are 56.7 per cent (11.4 times the average) and 
31.6 per cent (31.9 times the average), respectively. This contrasts with the bottom 30 per cent 
of the distribution, which collectively owned just one per cent of global wealth. Thus the top 
one per cent owned about 32 times as much as the bottom three deciles. 
                                                                                                                                                        
effect using U.K. data —a maximum decline from 30.8% to 25.6% in the share of the top 1% in going from an adult 
to family basis. Frick et al. (2007) compare individual and household distributions of wealth using the 2002 German 
SOEP survey. (It is very unusual for wealth survey data to allow such a comparison). Gini coefficients are .787 for 
individuals and .734 for households, but this again gives an upper bound on the difference that interests us. The Frick 
et al. calculation is on a per capita basis, which gives lower inequality for households than would be obtained with 
the conventional equal weighting of households. 
38 There are 229 countries in total, but a number of small countries with identical imputed wealth levels and 
distributions were merged at this point. 
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Table 9 gives wealth Gini coefficients for the larger countries and for the world as a whole. 
As mentioned earlier, wealth distribution is unambiguously more unequal than income 
distribution in all countries which allow comparison. The wealth Gini coefficient estimates for 
individual countries in Table 9 range from a low of 0.547 for Japan to the high values 
reported for Brazil (0.784) and the USA (0.801). Appendix IV indicates that Switzerland, 
whose distribution is based on hard data with good detail in the upper tail, has a Gini 
coefficient of 0.803.39 The USA and Switzerland have Gini coefficients close to the global 
wealth Gini of 0.802. Note that as is true within countries, the global figure is considerably 
higher than the values computed for the global income distribution. Milanovic (2005: 108) 
reports a Gini coefficient of 0.642, for example, for the world distribution of income in 1998 
on a PPP basis. 
Table 8 provides the regional representation in the various wealth quantiles. The top end of 
the global wealth distribution is dominated by North America, Europe and the rich Asia-
Pacific countries, with Europe having 35 per cent of the members of the top decile, and North 
America and rich Asia-Pacific each contributing just above 20 per cent. The North American 
share rises rapidly in the upper tail, to 39 per cent in the top percentile, overtaking Europe 
whose share declines to 31 per cent. 
The middle half of the distribution is the domain of China, which supplies a third of the 
membership of deciles 4-8. In contrast, India is concentrated at the lower end of the global 
wealth distribution; the membership share is almost a quarter (21.9 per cent, in fact) for the 
bottom three deciles, and then declines monotonically with wealth right up to the top tail. The 
membership pattern of India is roughly similar to that of Africa. 
Residents of Latin America and the Caribbean are spread across the entire global distribution, 
reflecting the great inequality of wealth-holding in that region. Taken as a whole, Asia-Pacific 
countries apart from China and India are also quite evenly spread, although there is high 
polarization, with rich Asia-Pacific countries occupying the top end and the lower income 
countries (especially, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Vietnam) being found in the lower 
tail. 
Table 9 provides more details for those countries that have either high wealth (more than one 
per cent of global wealth or more than one per cent of members of the world top wealth 
                                                 
39 We saw earlier that Switzerland had the highest share of the top 1% for the countries with hard data on that share, 
shown in Table 7. Dell et al. (2005) discuss the causes of Switzerland’s high wealth inequality. 
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decile) or else adult populations exceeding 45 million. A country’s ranking in the global top 
wealth decile depends on a combination of three factors: population size, mean wealth, and 
wealth inequality. The USA heads the list, with 19.4 per cent of the world’s top decile and 
36.8 per cent of the top percentile. Large population, high mean wealth, and high wealth 
inequality all reinforce each other in the USA case to produce this result. Japan comes a 
strong second to the USA, with 14.1 per cent of the top decile and 12.0 per cent of the top 
percentile. This strong performance reflects not only Japan’s population size, but also its high 
personal saving rate and resulting high household asset levels. Germany, the UK, and Italy 
follow Japan with 7.0, 5.9 and 5.8 per cent of the top decile respectively, accounting for more 
than half of the 35.2 per cent population share of Europe in the top global decile. Note also 
that Italy, like Japan, has very low representation in the bottom half of the world distribution, 
and in particular relatively fewer members than the USA, Germany or the UK. This reflects, 
in part, the remarkably low level of household debt in Italy. 
Table 9 also reports figures for median wealth across countries, which reflect variations in 
both mean wealth and inequality. One interesting observation is that median wealth rarely 
exceeds 50 per cent of mean wealth. In addition, the rank order of countries changes 
significantly when medians are used instead of mean values. Of the countries listed in the 
table, the USA ranked first in mean wealth per adult, followed by the UK, Japan, and then 
Italy. However, of this group, Japan ranks first in terms of median wealth per adult, followed 
by Italy, the UK, and then the USA. Indeed, Japan’s median wealth was more than double the 
figure for the USA although its mean wealth was 22 per cent lower. 
Missing from Table 9, of course, are the world’s smaller countries, some of which are of 
special interest. (See Appendix IV for details on all countries.) For example, some of the 
countries with very high wealth rankings have much less spectacular income rankings. Hong 
Kong and Ireland are examples of this. Also, some countries rank very high in per capita 
income but are not close to the top of the wealth rankings. This is perhaps most notable for 
the Nordic countries: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland. A possible 
explanation is that strong public infrastructure and social programmes in these countries make 
it less necessary for people to build up personal assets than in countries where there is less 
public wealth and social insurance.  
5.2 Sensitivity of Global Estimate to Assumptions and Imputations 
We need to check the sensitivity of the global estimate to some key assumptions and to the 
use of imputed data. In checking the latter aspect we will examine the distribution of wealth 
for just the 20 core countries for which we have hard data. 
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We begin by checking the sensitivity of our results to the use of PPP rather than official 
exchange rates. The first two rows of Table 10 show global estimates prepared on these 
alternative bases. By lowering the wealth levels of poorer countries, the shift from PPP to 
official exchange rates leads to a significant rise in measured inequality. The share of the top 
decile increases from 70.7 to 85.1 per cent, and the share of the top percentile from 31.6 to 
40.1 per cent. The world Gini coefficient jumps from 0.802 to 0.892, now far exceeding the 
figure recorded for any individual country.40 The use of official exchange rates may thus be 
viewed as magnifying wealth level differences across countries and ensuring that inter-
country variations make a greater contribution to global wealth inequality.41 
In contrast, Table 10 shows that the assumptions used during the course of our analysis have 
very little impact on global wealth distribution. Rows 3–5 report the PPP figures 
corresponding to row 1 after omitting countries for which data has been imputed from region-
income group averages. Row 3 discards those with imputed wealth levels; row 4 those 
without income distribution data (and hence no way of estimating wealth inequality); and row 
5 those with either form of imputation. The results show that the regional-income group 
imputations affect less than 6 per cent of the global adult population and less than 3 per cent 
of global wealth, so it is perhaps not surprising to discover no discernible impact on the global 
wealth distribution. 
The last two rows take an even more extreme position, excluding all countries except the 20 
nations listed in Table 6 which have wealth distribution data. Restricting attention to these 20 
countries loses 25 per cent of the world’s wealth and 41 per cent of the world’s adults. 
Nevertheless, the figures in row 6 for our core group of 20 countries are little different from 
the row 1 benchmark, with a top 1 per cent share of 31.7 per cent compared to 31.6 per cent, 
for example, and a Gini coefficient of 0.796 compared to 0.802. 
                                                 
40 This parallels the result in Milanovic (2005) for the global income distribution. Milanovic has a world income 
Gini coefficient in 1998 of 0.642 on a PPP basis but 0.795 using official exchange rates. 
41 The particular approach to estimating PPPs used in the Penn World Tables, the Geary-Khamis method, may also 
have an effect on our results. While it is widely used in the study of international differences in income this method 
produces smaller estimated differences in living standards between rich and poor countries than some other popular 
methods, for example the EKS method used by the World Bank (see, for example, United Nations 2007.) Using 
PPPs based on the Geary-Khamis method likely leads to lower estimates of world wealth inequality than would be 
obtained using the EKS method. 
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The final row 7 keeps the same 20 core countries but discards the ‘true’ wealth distribution 
figures, replacing them instead with the estimate derived from income distribution data that 
was applied to most countries. Comparing rows 6 and 7 suggests that the estimation 
procedure reduces wealth inequality at the very top of the distribution, with the share of the 
top 1 per cent falling from 31.7 per cent to 27.4 per cent. However, the share of the top two 
quintiles rises and the share of the bottom three quintiles falls, suggesting a shift towards 
greater inequality. The combined impact is evidently small, with the world Gini coefficient 
changing from 0.796 to 0.801. Overall, it seems that our method of estimating wealth 
distributions from income distributions, and the other estimation and imputation procedures 
used during the course of our study, have little impact on the global wealth inequality figures. 
The impact is certainly less than the change induced by switching from PPP figures to official 
exchange rate valuations, which is a conceptual distinction rather than an assumption adopted 
for computational convenience. 
Other respects also lead us to believe that our estimates of the top wealth shares are 
reasonable. The survey data on which most of our estimates are based under-represent the rich 
and do not reflect the holdings of the super-rich. This suggests that our estimated shares of the 
top percentile and top decile, for example, may err on the low side. A rough idea of the 
possible size of the error is given by the total wealth of the world’s billionaires reported by 
Forbes magazine for the year 2000, which was $2.16 trillion. This represents 1.7 per cent of 
our figure of $125.6 trillion (at official exchange rates) for total world household wealth. Thus 
if our estimates erred so badly as to exclude all the world’s billionaires, the shares of the top 
percentile and top decile would be depressed by less than two percentage points. 
As discussed in Davies et al. (2008), a further check was accomplished by fitting a Pareto 
distribution to the upper tail of our estimated global wealth distribution (based on official 
exchange rates). The Pareto distribution well approximates the upper tail of both income and 
wealth distribution data at the national level, and is a remarkably close fit to our global 
distribution in the range from $250,000 to $5 million. While the fit deteriorates at $10 million, 
it gives us added confidence in the quality of our estimated distribution up to this point, which 
covers all but a very small percentage of the world’s population. 
 
6 Conclusion  
This paper has found that the global distribution of household wealth is highly concentrated. 
Using PPP valuations, we estimate that the top 10 per cent of adults in the world owned 71 
per cent of household wealth in the year 2000 and that the Gini coefficient for global wealth 
holdings was 0.802. Measured wealth inequality is higher still if international comparisons are 
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based on official exchange rates, which is appropriate if attention is focused on the rich and 
super rich: the share of the top decile rises to 85 per cent and the Gini coefficient becomes 
0.892. These statistics indicate that the world’s wealth distribution is considerably more 
unequal than its income distribution, for which Milanovic (2005) reports Gini coefficients of 
0.642 and 0.795 on PPP and exchange rate bases, respectively. The estimated distribution is 
little altered if we restrict attention to the 20 core countries with hard data that have 59% of 
the world’s adult population. For this core group the Gini coefficient of wealth is 0.796 on a 
PPP basis.  
This study began by assembling information on household wealth levels and portfolio 
composition for as many countries as possible. Wealth levels vary widely and we find that the 
wealth/income ratio for countries rises with income or wealth, so that international wealth 
differences are greater, relatively speaking, than those for income. Also, we find that the 
correlation of national income and wealth, while strong, is not perfect. The wealthiest 
countries include some, like Ireland and Hong Kong, that rank significantly lower according 
to per capita income. Similarly, some countries with very high incomes, such as the Nordic 
group, rank much lower according to wealth. This finding calls attention to the fact that while 
greater wealth is desirable ceteris paribus, it may not be a blessing if higher personal wealth is 
due to pure asset price inflation (e.g. house prices) or if the higher wealth is needed to 
compensate for deficiencies in public infrastructure, pensions or social insurance 
programmes. The relatively low ranking of the Nordic countries may therefore be viewed as a 
positive reflection of high quality public services and programmes.  
Wealth composition was seen to vary, not only with the stage of development, but across 
countries at similar income levels. These variations may be explained in terms of institutional 
and traditional differences, varying importance of public pensions, and other factors. The 
importance of both financial assets and borrowing rises sharply with per capita income and 
with financial market development. Conversely, household balance sheets in poor countries 
remain dominated by land and other tangible assets. 
Using regression analysis and other imputation methods, mean wealth levels were assigned to 
countries lacking adequate wealth data. This generates estimated wealth levels for 229 
countries and a snapshot of what Milanovic (2005) and others refer to as ‘international 
inequality’, that is inequality between countries. On a PPP basis, wealth per adult for most 
countries fell between the figure of $12,021 for India and $201,319 for the United States in 
the year 2000. The between-country Gini coefficient for wealth per adult was 0.533 compared 
to 0.448 for GDP per adult. 
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Having obtained estimates of wealth level by country, details of the shape of the wealth 
distribution were assembled for as many countries as possible. The data covered 20 countries, 
which together account for 59 per cent of the world population in 2000 and, we estimate, 84 
per cent of global wealth. Wealth inequality varies widely across these countries but is always 
greater than income inequality. The group includes all the populous rich countries along with 
the largest developing nations, China, India and Indonesia. It allows us to study the relation 
between wealth distribution and income distribution, and to generate rough estimates of 
wealth inequality for 124 countries that have income distribution data but no wealth 
distribution data. Simple imputations of wealth inequality were applied to the remaining 
countries, which comprised less than four per cent of the world population. Combining the 
wealth distribution estimates with the wealth level numbers, and weighting by population, 
then yielded our estimates of the world distribution of wealth. 
Our estimate of 0.802 for the world wealth Gini coefficient is high, both compared to the Gini 
values for many countries, and compared to Gini values that have been estimated for the 
world distribution of income. However, it is interesting to note that some countries have 
similarly high values of wealth Gini coefficients. Among countries with hard data these 
include the USA at 0.801 and Switzerland at 0.803. According to the Gini coefficient, 
therefore, such countries contain within their borders about the same level of wealth 
inequality as is seen in the world as a whole. 
Our results also allow us to comment on the relative importance of between- vs. within-
country wealth inequality. As reported earlier, between-country differences in wealth per 
adult yield a Gini coefficient of 0.533 on a PPP basis. Adding within-country differences 
pushes the Gini coefficient to 0.802, suggesting that within-country differences are a very 
important component of world wealth inequality. This impression is confirmed by comparison 
with the world income distribution results of Milanovic (2005), which show a between-
country Gini coefficient of 0.531 and a full Gini coefficient of 0.641 in 1998 (for a common 
sample of countries over the years 1988-98). The Milanovic results thus show between-
country income inequality equal to 83 per cent of total inequality, which is much greater than 
the 71 per cent obtained here for wealth. 
We have discussed the regional aspect of global wealth distribution as well, pointing out the 
dominance of North America, Europe and the rich Asia-Pacific countries in the top global 
percentiles. The popular press sometimes suggests that high wealth individuals from emerging 
market economies—especially China, India and Russia—are already strongly represented 
among the world’s rich. Our figures indicate that at least as of the year 2000 the emerging 
market economies did not supply a significant share of the top 1% of global wealthholders. 
With the possible exception of China they appear unlikely to do so for some time. 
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While this paper makes a start in estimating the world distribution of wealth, it is clear that 
there are gaps in the data and significant concerns about data quality in some countries. 
Globally, there is great room for improvement in the study of household wealth. Household 
balance sheets and wealth surveys need to be generated in many more countries. These are 
completely lacking in Latin America, and almost totally absent in Africa. The development of 
financial institutions and property rights are key aspects of economic growth and human 
development. Without the relevant data it is impossible to see what progress is being made. 
Improvements in data quality, particularly in survey data, must also occur. The task is far 
from hopeless, however, and great strides have been taken in several countries. The fact that 
regular wealth surveys are conducted in the two largest developing countries, China and India, 
is encouraging. As balance sheet studies spread, and as more and better surveys are 
conducted, a better picture will emerge of the level, composition and distribution of household 
wealth around the globe. 
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Table 1 Coverage of wealth levels data, year 2000 
 
High income 
Upper middle 
income 
Lower middle 
income 
Low income 
Cumulative % of 
world population 
Complete financial and non-financial data      
Household Balance Sheets North America Europe Asia-Pacific       
15.3 
 Canada Denmark  Australia Czech Republic     
 USA Finland Taiwan Poland     
   France  Japan South Africa     
   Germany  New Zealand       
   Italy Singapore       
  Netherlands     
   Portugal         
   Spain         
   UK       
Survey data  
  
  China India  
56.0 
    Indonesia 
Incomplete data 
Financial Balance Sheets   Austria Korea Croatia Bulgaria   
59.5 
   Belgium   Estonia Romania   
   Greece   Hungary Turkey   
   Slovenia   Latvia     
   Sweden   Lithuania     
   Switzerland   Slovakia     
Survey data: non-financial assets   Mexico     61.1 
Number of countries with wealth partly or 
fully estimated by regression method 
18 28 36 46 95.2 
Number of countries with wealth imputed 
by mean value of group 
33 17 22  9 100.0 
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Table 2: Percentage composition of household wealth in household balance sheets, year 2000 
 Share of total gross assets  Share of financial assets 
 
financial 
assets 
non-financial 
assets housing Liabilities  liquid assets equities 
other financial 
assetsa 
Household balance sheets 
Australia 41 59 20 17  22 20 58 
Canada 57 43 20 18  25 32 43 
Czech Republic 34 66 Na 9  60 24 16 
Denmark 55 45 24 30  21 31 48 
Finland 41 59 48 13  33 45 22 
France 40 60 29 11  33 32 35 
Germany 40 60 42 16  34 37 29 
Italy 42 58 50 3  23 55 21 
Japan 50 50 Na 14  53 16 31 
Netherlands 54 46 38 16  19 24 57 
New Zealand 32 68 59 20  35 40 25 
Poland 20 80 62 3  59 25 17 
Portugal 49 51 39 19  47 38 15 
Singapore 45 55 47 18  44 21 35 
South Africa 65 35 16 15  21 19 60 
Spain 31 69 60 10  40 43 17 
Taiwan 59 41 20 10  39 32 29 
UK 53 47 35 13  20 24 55 
USA 67 33 26 15  13 51 36 
38 
 
 Share of total gross assets  Share of financial assets 
 
financial 
assets 
non-
financial 
assets 
housing Liabilities  liquid assets equities 
other 
financial 
assets 
Financial balance sheets 
Austria      55 26 19 
Belgium      25 59 16 
Bulgariab      88 5 7 
Croatiab      85 6 9 
Estonia      26 54 20 
Greece      44 51 4 
Hungary      43 43 14 
Latvia      53 44 3 
Lithuania      33 40 27 
Romaniab      76 21 3 
Slovakiab      74 12 14 
Slovenia      52 31 17 
South Korea      61 18 21 
Sweden      14 45 40 
Switzerland      21 38 41 
Turkeyb      62 32 6 
Note: aOther financial assets include insurance and pension reserves and other accounts receivable. bComposition from year 2004. 
Source: see Appendix IIB. 
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Table 3: Percentage composition of household wealth in survey data, year 2000 
 Share of total assets  Share of financial assets 
 
financial 
assets 
non-financial 
assets housing liabilities 
 
liquid assets equities 
other financial 
assetsa 
Australia 32 68 54 14  14 21 64 
Canada 29 71 38 16  19 23 58 
Chinab 22 78 57 1  na na na 
Finland 17 83 75 12  51 36 14 
Germany 24 76 na 15  46 24 30 
India 5 95 28 3  92 5 3 
Indonesia 3 97 46 2  na na na 
Italy 18 78 69 2  40 39 na 
Japan 30 70 54 10  59 34 29 
Netherlands 21 80 70 27  37 43 20 
New Zealand 28 72 37 16  21 21 58 
Spain 13 87 58 9  40 38 22 
USA 42 58 32 12  15 39 46 
Note: aOther financial assets include insurance and pension plans and other accounts receivable. bHousing assets are net of associated debts; liabilities exclude housing debt. 
Source: see Appendix II. 
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Table 4: Wealth per capita from household balance sheet and survey data, year 2000 
 US$ per capita at PPP exchange rates  US$ per capita at official exchange rates 
 Wealtha 
Real 
GDPb 
Personal 
disposable 
incomec 
Real 
Consumptionb 
 
Wealtha GDPb 
Personal 
disposable 
incomec Consumptionb 
Household balance sheet data 
Mean 84955 22519 13482 14240  74890 19434 11530 12239 
Median 90906 23917 12798 15197  70916 21425 11915 12708 
Coefficient of variation 0.440 0.301 0.331 0.319  0.612 0.527 0.524 0.521 
          
Highest wealth: USA 143727 35619 25480 24313  143727 35619 25480 24313 
Lowest wealth: South Africa 16266 8017 4691 5210  5977 2946 1724 1914 
 
Survey data 
Mean 59349 20311 12338 13072  53251 17983 10911 11588 
Median 61218 23917 12798 15197  45176 20338 11557 12708 
Coefficient of variation 0.667 0.512 0.551 0.530  0.836 0.669 0.707 0.671 
          
Highest wealth: USA 143857 35619 25480 24313  143857 35619 25480 24313 
Lowest wealth: India 6513 2684 1916 1406  1112 458 327 240 
          
Ratio high/low:  HBS 8.8 4.4 5.4 4.7  24.1 12.1 14.8 12.7 
Ratio high/low: survey data 22.1 13.3 13.3 17.3  129.4 77.8 77.9 101.4 
China/USA: survey data 12.8 9.3 13.2 13.0  55.1 40.0 56.8 56.1 
Note: aSee Appendix II for sources of HBS and survey data. Figures have been adjusted to year 2000 values using the real growth rate per capita. bSource: Penn 
World Table Version 6.1. cSource: The Economist Intelligence Unit. 
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Table 5 Regressions of wealth components 
Independent variables Log wealth Log non-financial wealth Log financial wealth Log liabilities 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
Constant -3.031* -2.408*** -2.919** -1.765** -4.237** -4.547*** -5.726** -3.131*
 (1.508) (0.680) (1.130) (0.634) (1.718) (1.133) (2.197) (1.693) 
Log real consumption per  0.907*** 0.886*** 0.580*** 0.681*** 0.940*** 1.040*** 1.241*** 1.199*** 
capita  (0.182) (0.067) (0.159) (0.083) (0.201) (0.138) (0.273) (0.222) 
Life expectancy in 1980 (L) 0.073** 0.063*** 0.103*** 0.075*** 0.043 0.044** -0.058* -0.069** 
 (0.028) (0.015) (0.028) (0.017) (0.027) (0.021) (0.035) (0.028) 
Average GDP per capita growth  -0.010  -0.048  0.114** 0.143*** -0.086  
1990-2000 (g) (0.050)  (0.047)  (0.046) (0.036) (0.061)  
Average population growth  0.192 0.174** 0.117  0.073  0.343*  
1990-2000 (p) (0.161) (0.075) (0.097)  (0.166)  (0.207)  
Log population density 0.134*** 0.117*** 0.134*** 0.117***        
 (0.035) (0.023) (0.034) (0.029)        
Log market capitalization rate 0.013    0.403*** 0.405***    
 (0.103)    (0.096) (0.084)    
Log domestic credits       0.831*** 0.702*** 
available to private sector   (0.179) (0.147)
Urban population (% of total) -0.003    0.002  0.017** 0.017** 
 (0.007) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.008)
Fixed line and mobile phone  -0.002    0.006  0.021*** 0.015** 
subscribers (per 100 people) (0.004)    (0.005)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Survey dummy -0.093  0.061  -1.331** -1.639*** 1.061  
 (0.415)  (0.251)  (0.542) (0.431) (0.681)  
Transition dummy -0.470 -0.430** -0.537** -0.533*** 0.135  0.719*  
 (0.320) (0.156) (0.245) (0.179) (0.325)  (0.402)  
R2 0.990 0.989 0.981 0.978     
‘R2’     0.968 0.966 0.960 0.953 
RMSE 0.212 0.182 0.233 0.227 0.377 0.385 0.483 0.519 
Sample size 22 22 23 23 38 38 38 38 
Note: The non-financial regressions use Ordinary Least Squares and a sample consisting of 19 countries with HBS data and 4 with survey data. The 
financial assets and liabilities regressions use the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method and a sample consisting of 35 countries with HBS 
or financial balance sheet data and 3 with survey data. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 1% 
level.   R2 is not a well-defined concept in generalized least squares, so as is customary the fraction of the variance in the dependent variable that is 
‘explained’ in each regression is referred to as ‘R2’ here. 
Sources: (a) Life expectancy in 1980, gdp growth gdp per capita growth, population growth, market capitalization rate, availability of domestic 
credit, urban population and fixed line and mobile phone subscribers are from World Development Indicators 2005-2008. (b) Real consumption is 
from PWT 6.1. See Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the 
University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002. (c) Data for Taiwan is from the National Statistical Office’s website.  
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Table 6: Average wealth and income by region, year 2000 (PPP$) 
Region (number of countries) 
Share of world 
population 
(%) 
Wealth per 
capita 
 
Wealth per 
adult 
 
Share of world 
wealth 
(%) 
GDP per capita
 
GDP per adult
 
Share of world 
GDP 
(%) 
North America (5) 5.2 138417 193147 26.8 34947 48765 23.6 
Latin America and Caribbean (46) 8.6 19713 34031 6.4 7683 13262 8.6 
Europe (48) 12.0 62918 83336 28.2 16444 21780 25.7 
Africa (56) 13.4 4324 9336 2.2 2242 4842 3.9 
China 20.6 12819 19056 9.8 3844 5713 10.3 
India 16.8 6718 12021 4.2 2684 4802 5.9 
Rich Asia-Pacific (17) 4.0 101924 135572 15.3 23247 30912 12.1 
Other Asia-Pacific (55) 19.5 9808 18054. 7.2 3911 7206 10.0 
World (229) 100 26738 44024 100 7675 12633 100 
World between-country Gini coeff.  0.583 0.533  0.503 0.448  
Note: The world between-country Gini coefficient is the Gini inequality value computed using the per capita (or adult) wealth (or income) figures for 229 countries weighted by 
population size.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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 Table 7: Wealth shares for countries with wealth distribution data 
   Share of lowest Share of top 
Country  Year Unit 10% 20% 25% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 75% 80% 90% 10% 5% 2% 1% 0.5% 0.1%
Australia 2002 household -0.1 0.2 1.6 4.4 8.9 15.4 24.4  36.9 55.2 44.9 31.0
Canada 1999 family 1.0 3.0 6.0 11.0 19.0  30.0 47.0 53.0
China 2002 individual 0.7 2.8 5.8 9.6 14.4 20.6 28.9  40.7 58.6 41.4
Denmark 1996 family -14.4 -17.3 -18.1 -18.1 -17.6 -15.8 -10.5  1.3 23.6 76.4 56.0 28.8 22.2 11.6
Finland 1998 household -0.9 -0.9 -0.3 2.2 7.4 15.0 25.0  38.6 57.7 42.3
France 1994 adult   39.0 61.0 21.3 6.3
Germany 1998 household -0.3 -0.2 0.3 1.5 3.9 9.0 18.9  34.0 55.7 44.4
India 2002-03 household 0.2 1.0 2.5 4.8 8.1 12.9 19.8  30.1 47.1 52.9 38.3 15.7
Indonesia 1997 household 0.0 0.4 1.3 2.8 5.1 8.5 13.5  21.1 34.6 65.4 56.0 28.7
Ireland 1987 household 0.0 0.2 2.5 6.6 12.2 18.9 28.5  40.4 57.7 42.3 28.7 10.4
Italy 2000 household 7.0   36.2 51.5 48.5 36.4 17.2
Japan 1999 household 0.5 2.1 4.8 8.7 13.9 20.7 29.8  42.3 60.7 39.3
South Korea 1988 household 0.5 1.8 4.0 7.4 12.3 18.9 27.9  39.9 56.9 43.1 31.0 14.0
New Zealand 2001 econ. unit   48.3 51.7
Norway 2000 household 0.1 0.7 2.6 5.8 10.4 16.4 24.2  34.6 49.6 50.5
Spain 2002 household 2.1 13.2  34.7 58.1 41.9 18.3 13.1 5.6
Sweden 2002 household -5.7 -6.8 -6.9 -6.6 -4.8 -0.6 7.1  19.9 41.4 58.6
Switzerland 1997 family   28.7 71.3 58.0 34.8 27.6 16.0
UK 2000 adult 5.0  25.0 44.0 56.0 44.0 31.0 23.0
USA 2001 family -0.2 -0.1 0.2 1.1 2.8 5.6 10.1  17.4 30.2 69.8 57.7 32.7
Note: The data is reported as in the original sources and may contain rounding errors   Source: See Appendix IIC. 
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Table 8: Global wealth distribution per adult in 2000, regional details based on PPP exchange rates 
 Decile Top Adult 
population 
(million) 
Adult 
population 
share (%)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10% 5% 1% 
World wealth shares (%) 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.6 2.4 3.8 6.3 13.1 70.7 56.7 31.6
Minimum wealth (PPP$) 0.5 735 1837 3658 5802 8635 13022 20884 36944 89569 172236 518364
 
Adult population proportions by region (%) 
North America 1.5 2.8 3.9 3.5 3.9 3.8 4.8 6.0 9.1 21.7 25.5 39.1 225.7 6.1 
Latin America and Caribbean 10.8 9.1 8.7 7.2 6.8 7.0 8.2 8.7 8.8 6.5 5.9 5.9 302.9 8.2 
Europe 9.1 9.2 9.7 9.8 9.7 11.9 14.3 17.8 22.2 35.2 36.5 31.4 550.6 14.9 
Africa 33.1 19.0 14.4 9.0 6.3 5.6 5.2 4.3 3.4 1.6 1.2 1.0 376.3 10.2 
China 4.3 13.0 11.8 30.5 36.9 36.9 33.5 31.5 24.1 5.3 2.3 0.0 842.1 22.8 
India 18.4 21.9 25.3 19.6 17.0 15.9 14.3 11.6 7.9 2.5 1.2 0.0 570.6 15.4 
Rich Asia-Pacific 0.2 0.6 1.2 1.4 1.9 2.2 2.7 5.4 12.8 21.1 22.7 18.9 183.3 5.0 
Other Asia-Pacific 22.6 24.4 24.8 19.0 17.5 16.8 17.0 14.8 11.7 6.1 4.6 3.8 646.1 17.5
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 3697.5 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Table 9: Global wealth distribution in 2000: country details based on PPP exchange rates 
 Quintiles Top Adult 
population 
(million) 
Population 
share  
(%) 
Mean wealth 
per adult 
(PPP$) 
Wealth share 
(%) 
Median wealth 
per adult 
(PPP$) 
Gini 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 10% 5% 1% 
USA 3.7 6.8 7.1 9.8 27.5 19.4 23.3 36.8 202.9 5.5 201319 25.1 41682 0.801 
Japan 0.1 0.9 1.5 3.6 21.3 14.1 15.8 12.0 100.9 2.7 157146 9.7 93152 0.547 
Germany 3.5 1.0 1.6 2.6 8.9 7.0 8.9 3.9 64.8 1.8 115325 4.6 39709 0.667 
UK 0.4 1.2 1.7 2.0 6.7 5.9 5.8 6.4 43.9 1.2 172461 4.6 77439 0.697 
Italy 0.0 0.3 0.8 2.6 8.9 5.8 5.5 5.4 46.4 1.3 150327 4.3 80043 0.609 
China 17.3 42.3 73.8 64.9 29.4 5.3 2.3 842.1 22.8 19056 9.9 10411 0.550 
Spain 0.1 0.6 0.8 1.0 6.1 3.6 3.5 1.4 32.2 0.9 117837 2.3 72483 0.570 
France 0.3 1.1 1.6 3.0 6.0 3.5 3.9 5.9 44.4 1.2 126360 3.4 36975 0.730 
India 40.3 44.9 32.9 25.9 10.3 2.5 1.2 570.6 15.4 12021 4.2 4809 0.669 
Canada 0.6 0.7 0.5 1.0 3.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 22.8 0.6 120326 1.7 45850 0.688 
Brazil 8.0 5.9 4.8 5.3 4.3 1.8 1.6 1.4 104.2 2.8 27559 1.8 6046 0.784 
Taiwan 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 2.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 15.5 0.4 143405 1.4 62867 0.655 
South Korea 0.2 0.8 1.3 2.5 4.2 1.6 0.9 0.8 33.2 0.9 58314 1.2 33038 0.579 
Australia 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 2.4 1.6 1.7 1.3 13.7 0.4 126635 1.1 75027 0.622 
Netherlands 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.6 2.2 1.4 1.7 1.6 12.0 0.3 159910 1.2 71441 0.650 
Mexico 3.1 2.8 2.6 3.6 3.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 56.1 1.5 34879 1.2 9731 0.749 
Argentina 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.4 2.4 1.2 1.1 1.2 23.3 0.6 71115 1.0 20264 0.740 
Russia 6.7 6.3 5.7 6.9 3.5 1.0 0.8 0.6 107.5 2.9 20005 1.3 7438 0.699
Indonesia 11.1 9.5 6.3 5.1 1.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 124.4 3.4 13642 1.0 3838 0.764 
Turkey 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 40.4 1.1 27657 0.7 9100 0.718 
Thailand 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.6 2.2 0.7 0.6 0.4 40.2 1.1 30344 0.7 10101 0.710 
Pakistan 5.0 5.3 4.4 2.4 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 68.0 1.8 12390 0.5 4643 0.698 
Viet Nam 3.0 3.0 2.6 2.4 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 44.0 1.2 14613 0.4 5684 0.682
Bangladesh 6.2 5.7 3.6 1.9 0.5 0.1 0.1 66.5 1.8 7734 0.3 3304 0.660 
Nigeria 11.6 1.6 0.5 0.2 0.0 51.4 1.4 1423 0.0 434 0.736 
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 3697.5 100 44024 100 8635 0.802 
Note: Countries are listed according to the number of members of the global top wealth decile. Estimated figures in italics. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 10: Global wealth distribution under alternative assumptions  
  Number of 
countries 
Adult 
population 
Share of adult 
population 
Wealth per 
adult 
Share of 
wealth 
World wealth shares 
Gini 
  Quintile Top 
   (million) (%) ($) (%) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 10% 5% 1%  
(1) All countries, PPP valuations 229 3697.5 100 44024 100 0.4 1.7 4.0 10.1 83.9 70.7 56.7 31.6 0.802 
(2) All countries, official exchange rates 229 3697.5 100 33995 100 0.1 0.5 1.4 4.2 93.8 85.1 70.6 40.1 0.892 
     Excluding regional average imputations for:              
(3) average wealth level 148 3540.8 95.8 45047 98.0 0.4 1.7 4.0 10.1 83.8 70.7 56.5 31.6 0.801 
(4) wealth distribution 144 3596.8 97.3 44623 98.6 0.4 1.7 4.1 10.1 83.7 70.6 56.6 31.6 0.801 
(5) average wealth level and distribution 129 3491.1 94.4 45494 97.6 0.4 1.7 4.1 10.1 83.7 70.6 56.5 31.5 0.801 
     Countries with wealth distribution data:              
(6) using reported wealth distributions 20 2171.1 58.7 56450 75.3 0.5 1.9 4.0 10.0 83.6 69.9 55.7 31.7 0.796 
(7) imputing from income distributions 20 2171.1 58.7 56450 75.3 0.3 1.3 3.7 10.6 84.1 69.4 54.0 27.4 0.801 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix I: Household balance sheet (HBS) data: methods  
There is considerable variation between countries in how household balance sheets are constructed, 
who puts them together, sectoral definition, and asset coverage. In some countries, for example 
Australia, the UK, and France the balance sheets, or at least their major elements, are compiled as part 
of the system of national accounts (SNA). Elsewhere, for example the USA, Canada, and Japan, they 
are assembled together with flow of funds (FOF) data. In other cases central banks or national 
statistical agencies issue HBS data independent of the SNA or FOF. The OECD publishes the financial 
balance sheet of the household sector for its member countries (OECD 2005).1 As reflected in our 
Table 1, however, fully comparable household balance sheets including non-financial assets are 
available for only a subset of OECD countries.  
What is important is not who delivers the HBS data, but who and what are covered, and how the data 
are constructed. The objective is to estimate the balance sheet of the household sector as of a certain 
date—often but not always the year-end. This can be done by trying to measure the relevant stocks, or 
by updating previous stock figures by adding estimates of subsequent flows. Both stocks and flows 
can be measured by direct or indirect means (Aron et al. 2008). In the direct approach data are 
collected from household members through sample surveys, censuses or administrative records. In the 
indirect approach the values for the household sector by asset type are calculated as residuals from 
independent totals by deducting the estimated holdings of other sectors. Often the independent totals 
are counterpart data, for example the liabilities of the banking sector in the form of deposits. In most 
countries a mix of direct and indirect approaches is used.  
In the USA, for example, most categories of financial assets and liabilities are calculated using the 
indirect approach (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2003). That is, amounts held or 
owed by the other sectors are subtracted from known totals and the remainders are assumed to be the 
amounts held by the household sector. For consumer credit no deductions are necessary. When micro-
data are available, assets and liability totals for the household sector are reviewed in light of that data 
and sometimes adjusted accordingly. The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which is conducted 
every three years by the Federal Reserve Board, is used for this purpose. House values and equity in 
unincorporated business are estimated using the perpetual inventory method. Land values are updated 
based on an index of land prices. 
In the UK, financial assets are measured mostly using the residual approach based on data from banks 
and other financial intermediaries. Ordinary shares are estimated with the help of a sample survey, the 
Share Registers Survey, whereas unlisted company shares are estimated using the estate multiplier 
method. Data on life assurance and pensions funds are obtained from returns made by insurance 
companies and pension funds. The value of fixed assets is derived using a number of sources. Some of 
the net capital stock estimates included in non-financial assets are calculated using the perpetual 
inventory method (Aron et al. 2008). Residential housing stock estimates are compiled using property 
tax records of local authorities, and farm land and buildings are estimated from data on farm sizes and 
prices from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.  
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As a final example, in Italy financial assets are also measured using the residual approach and are 
based on data from banks, credit institutions, insurance companies etc. (Brandolini et al. 2004). Debts 
comprise all short and long term liabilities and are estimated using the same approach. The stock of 
dwellings is based on a series provided by the Italian Statistics Office given at constant rather than 
market prices. The series is corrected to be expressed in market prices using a housing price series 
based on information assembled in a semi-annual survey of real estate agents. Benchmark values of 
the stock of dwellings and the share owned by households are obtained using census data. Apart from 
housing assets, only durables are included in fixed assets. The stock of durables is computed using the 
perpetual inventory method. 
Non-financial coverage in the HBS data is not completely uniform. While the data for all countries 
considered here include owner-occupied housing there are variations in the coverage of other real 
estate and consumer durables, as reflected in Appendix IIB. It is difficult to devise a satisfactory 
estimation procedure for land or investment real estate,2 so these items have not been imputed. Since 
only four countries lack these items entirely, and eight countries, including the USA, have complete 
data, the impact would not be substantial, although the omissions will have some effect on our results, 
In contrast, it is reasonably easy to construct estimates of consumer durables, and since this improves 
the non-financial asset coverage for thirteen countries, these imputations were included.3 
Appendix IIB also reveals differences in sectoral definition across countries. We aimed for a 
household sector which covered the assets and debts of households and unincorporated business. 
However, non-profit organizations (NPOs) are sometimes grouped with households. Data for the UK 
and USA allowed us to exclude NPOs. This correction is especially important for the USA, where 
NPOs account for about 6 per cent of the financial assets of the household sector (Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System 2003). The USA appears to be something of an outlier in terms of the 
importance of NPOs. 
 
 
__________________________________ 
1 Financial balance sheets for the household sector have also been published for eight countries in ‘New Europe’ by a 
financial group based in Italy. See UniCredit Group (2005). The countries covered are Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Turkey. We were only able to obtain non-financial data for the Czech Republic, 
and so it is the only one of these countries for which complete balance sheet numbers are reported in this paper. 
2 While balance sheet figures for dwellings also capture the value of land on which they stand, other land is missing for 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Singapore. Investment or commercial real estate is missing for the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal and Singapore, and for Italy (which covers all housing, whether owner occupied 
or not, but not other real estate). To the best of our knowledge, all real estate and land owned by households is 
included in the data in all other cases. 
3 Durables figures are available for Canada, the USA, Germany, Italy and South Africa. The mean ratio of durables to GDP in 
Canada and the USA was used to impute durables to Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. For European countries other than 
the UK, the mean ratio for Germany and Italy was used. Finally, the mean ratio for Canada, the USA, Germany, and Italy 
was used for imputations for Japan and Singapore. 
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Appendix IIA: Balance sheet data sources 
Country Financial data Non-financial data Financial and Non-Financial Data 
combined by… 
Link to open-access official data 
Australia Australian Bureau of Statistics (2005). 5204.0 
Australian System of National Accounts Table 51 
Same as for financial data  Australian Bureau of Statistics www.abs.gov.au/  
Austria OECD (2005)  n.a.  n.a.   
Belgium OECD (2005)  n.a.  n.a.   
Bulgaria UniCredit Group (2005).  n.a.  n.a.   
Canada Statistics Canada, National Balance Sheet 
Accounts 2000; CanSim Matrix 0751  
Same as for financial data  Statistics Canada   
Croatia UniCredit Group (2005).   n.a n.a.    
Czech Republic Czech Statistical Office. Sector Accounts Times 
Series. Table ST01415, 2006 
Same as for financial data Czech Statistical Office http://dw.czso.cz/ 
Denmark Statistics Denmark. National Accounts and 
Balance of Payments, Annual National Accounts 
ESA95, Balance Sheets for Financial Assets and 
Liabilities Table NAT10 
Statistics Denmark. National Accounts and 
Balance of Payments, Annual National 
Accounts ESA95, Fixed Capital Table Nat14 
Authors www.statbank.dk/ 
Estonia Eurostat Financial Balance Sheets  n.a. n.a.  http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/ 
Finland Statistics Finland. Financial Assets, Balance 
Sheets. Financial Liabilities, Balance Sheets 
Housing stock from financial accounts 
provided by Statistics Finland. 
Authors www.stat.fi  
France INSEE. Comptes Nationaux Annuels - Base 2000. 
Table 4515  
Same as for financial data INSEE www.insee.fr/  
Germany Deutsches Bundesbank (2004). Financial 
Accounts for Germany 1991 to 2003. Special 
Statistical Publication. Table XI p. 86 
Real assets data provided by Deutsches 
Bundesbank. 
Authors   
Greece Eurostat Financial Balance Sheets n.a. n.a. http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/ 
Hungary OECD (2005). n.a. n.a.  
Italy Financial Accounts by the Bank of Italy. Adjusted Italian Statistical Office data. Brandolini et al. (2004), Table 2, 
p.18. 
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Korea OECD (2005).  n.a. n.a.    
Latvia Eurostat Financial Balance Sheets  n.a. n.a. http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/ 
Lithuania Eurostat Financial Balance Sheets  n.a.  n.a. http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/ 
Netherlands van Els et al. (2005: Table 1 p.23) Statistics Netherlands. Sector Accounts: 
Financial Balance Sheets Table 4b. 
Authors www.cbs.nl/ 
New Zealand Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Household 
Financial Assets and Liabilities.  
Same as for financial data Reserve Bank of New Zealand www.rbnz.govt.nz/ 
Poland OECD (2005). Yemtsov (2007). Authors   
Portugal Financial Accounts by the Bank of Portugal. Housing stock estimates calculated based on 
data from the Central Statistical Office and 
the Bank of Portugal. 
Cardoso and da Cunha (2005: 
Table A1.1 p.41) 
  
Romania UniCredit Group (2005).   n.a. n.a.    
Singapore Singapore Department of Statistics (2003). Same as for financial data Singapore Department of 
Statistics 
  
Slovakia UniCredit Group (2005).   n.a. n.a.    
Slovenia Eurostat Financial Balance Sheets   n.a.   
South Africa  Aron and Muellbauer (2004: Table 2 p.50) Same as for financial data Aron and Muellbauer (2004)   
Spain Banco de Espana (2005). Financial Accounts of 
the Spanish Economy. Table II.5.e.  
Banco de Espana. Summary indicators: 
Household market indicators. 
Authors www.bde.es/ 
Sweden OECD (2005).   n.a. n.a.   
Switzerland Swiss National Bank. Swiss Financial Accounts. 
Table T11. 
 n.a. n.a. www.snb.ch  
Taiwan National Wealth Statistics. Statistical Tables. 
Table 7 (quoted from Central Bank Flow of 
Funds Statistics) 
Same as for financial data National Statistical Office http://eng.stat.gov.tw/ 
Turkey UniCredit Group (2005).   n.a. n.a.   
UK National Statistics Online. Financial Statistics 
Time Series Data Table 12.1N.  
United Kingdom National Accounts. Blue 
Book Time Series Data Table 10.10.  
Authors www.statistics.gov.uk/  
USA Federal Reserve Statistical Release. Flow of 
Funds Accounts of the United States. Release 
Z. I, June 9, 2005. Table B.100.  
Same as for financial data Federal Reserve www.federalreserve.gov/ 
 
Japan Economic Planning Agency, Government of 
Japan. Annual Report on National Accounts. 
Table 4 
Same as for financial data Economic Planning Agency, 
Government of Japan 
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Appendix IIB: Comparison of full household balance sheets 
Country Sector definition Non-housing real assets 
Consumer 
durables 
Australia households  yes imputed 
Canada households + NPOs  yes yes 
Czech Republic households yes imputed 
Denmark households + NPOs  yes imputed 
Finland households no imputed 
France households + NPOs yes imputed 
Germany households yes yes 
Italy households yes (only durables) yes 
Japan households yes imputed 
Netherlands households + NPOs no imputed 
New Zealand households  yes (only land) imputed 
Poland households no imputed 
Portugal households + NPOs yes (only land) imputed 
Singapore households no imputed 
South Africa households + NPOs  yes yes 
Spain households + NPOs yes (only real estate) imputed 
Taiwan households yes yes 
UK households (corrected for NPOs) yes imputed 
USA households (corrected for NPOs) yes yes 
Note: NPOs are non-profit institutions serving households. 
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Appendix IIC: Survey sources 
 
Australia 2002 Household Income, and Labour Dynamics; See Headey, et al (2005). 
Canada 1999 Survey of Financial Security; see Statistics Canada (2001). 
China 2002 China Academy of Social Science Survey; see Li and Zhao (2008). 
Denmark 1996 Wealth tax records; see Statistics Denmark (1998) and Ohlson et al. (2006). Supplemented with 
private communication with Statistics Denmark in 2007. 
Finland 1998 Household Wealth Survey; see Statistics Finland (2000). 
France 1994 Estate tax returns; see Piketty et al (2004). 
Germany 1998 Einkommens und verbrauchstichprobe; see Ammermüller et al. (2005). 
India 2002 All-India Debt and Investment Survey (NSS 59th round); see National Sample Survey 
Organization (2005), and Subramanian and Jayaraj (2008). 
Indonesia 1997 Indonesia Family Life Survey (own calculations); www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS/ 
Ireland 1987 The survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services; see Nolan (1991). 
Italy 2000 Survey of Household Income and Wealth; see Brandolini et al. (2004). 
Japan 1999 National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure; see Japan Statistics Bureau (2005). 
Korea 1988 Korea Development Institute Survey; see Leipziger et al. (1992). 
Mexico 2002 Encuesta Nacional sobre Niveles de Vida de los Hogares; see Jäntti and Sierminska (2007). 
New Zealand 2001 Household Saving Survey; see Statistics New Zealand (2002). 
Norway 2000 Income and Property Distribution Survey; see Statistics Norway (2005).  
Spain 2002 Survey of Household Finances; see Banco de Espana (2005) and Alvaredo and Saez (2006). 
Sweden 2002 Wealth statistics based on registers of total population; see Statistics Sweden (2004).  
Switzerland 1997 Survey based on county wealth tax statistics; see Dell et al. (2005). 
UK 2000 Inland Revenue Statistics; see Inland Revenue Statistics (2005). 
USA 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances 2001; see Kennickel (2006).  
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Appendix III: Wealth per capita from household balance sheet and survey data, 2000 
Country 
Wealth,a 
HBS 
Wealth,a survey 
data GDP
b Personal disposable incomec Real consumption 
US$ per capita at PPP exchange rates 
Australia 90906 101597 27193 15983 18913 
Canada 89252 72384 28731 17661 15994 
China  11267 3844 1934 1870 
Czech Republic 32431  14844 8205 10008 
Denmark 66191  28539 12348 17951 
Finland 53154 38754 24416 11285 15197 
France 94557  23614 14732 15672 
Germany 90768 55431 23917 15486 16603 
India  6513 2684 1916 1406 
Indonesia  7973 4035 2603 2614 
Italy 120897 74956 22876 15169 14195 
Japan 124858 91856 25924 15496 15975 
Netherlands 121165 43866 25759 12798 16159 
New Zealand 55823 61872 20008 12034 13534 
Poland 24654  9661 7083 6493 
Portugal 53811  17089 11700 10380 
Singapore 113631  28644 14885 9965 
South Africa 16266  8017 4691 5210 
Spain 93086 61218 19037 12544 13160 
Taiwan 100009  19714 11471 12603 
UK 128959  24252 17102 18238 
USA 143727 143857 35619 25480 24313 
US$ per capita at official exchange rates 
Australia 67990 75986 20338 11954 14145 
Canada 70916 57513 22828 14032 12708 
China  2613 891 448 434 
Czech Republic 10797  4942 2732 3332 
Denmark 70751  30505 13198 19188 
Finland 50984 37171 23419 10824 14576 
France 85794  21425 13367 14220 
Germany 86369 52744 22758 14735 15799 
India   1112 458 327 240 
Indonesia  1440 729 470 472 
Italy 98317 60957 18604 12336 11544 
Japan 180837 133038 37547 22443 23137 
Netherlands 109418 39613 23261 11557 14592 
New Zealand 37026 41038 13271 7982 8976 
Poland 10438  4090 2999 2749 
Portugal 33421  10614 7267 6447 
Singapore 90960  22929 11915 7977 
South Africa 5977  2946 1724 1914 
Spain 68693 45176 14048 9257 9711 
Taiwan 73654  14519 8448 9282 
UK 126832  23852 16820 17937 
USA 143727 143857 35619 25480 24313 
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Notes and source: aSource for HBS data: flow of funds data, national balance sheets and financial balance sheets 
augmented with estimates of housing assets. The original survey data are close to year 2000. Figures have been 
adjusted to year 2000 values using the real growth rate per capita. bSource: Penn World Table 6.1. cSource: The 
Economist Intelligence Unit. 
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Appendix IV: Regressions of wealth components 
Independent variables Log wealth Log non-financial wealth Log financial wealth Log liabilities 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
Constant -1.620 -1.496*** -2.349** -1.845*** -4.173** -5.003*** -6.318*** -4.713*** 
 (1.159) (0.395) (0.998) (0.519) (1.681) (1.081) (1.964) (1.506) 
Log personal disposable  0.910*** 0.946*** 0.679*** 0.733*** 1.073*** 1.163*** 1.305*** 1.358*** 
income per capita  (0.134) (0.054) (0.141) (0.072) (0.204) (0.145) (0.251) (0.208) 
Life expectancy in 1980 (L) 0.049* 0.047*** 0.085*** 0.072*** 0.035 0.036* -0.047 -0.072*** 
 (0.023) (0.010) (0.025) (0.014) (0.027) (0.021) (0.032) (0.024) 
Average GDP per capita  0.004  -0.033  0.135*** 0.136*** -0.072  
growth 1990-2000 (g) (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.047) (0.038) (0.057)  
Average population growth  0.007  0.018  -0.045  0.250  
1990-2000 (p) (0.131)  (0.090)  (0.175)  (0.199)  
Log population density 0.089** 0.087*** 0.107*** 0.093***        
 (0.029) (0.018) (0.031) (0.024)        
Log market capitalization rate 0.052    0.377*** 0.399***    
 (0.082)    (0.098) (0.087)    
Log domestic credits       0.884*** 0.897*** 
available to private sector       (0.161) (0.139) 
Urban population (% of total) 0.001    0.000  0.015* 0.016** 
 (0.005)    (0.008)  (0.008) (0.007) 
Fixed line and mobile phone  -0.001    0.001  0.015** 0.011** 
subscribers (per 100 people) (0.003)    (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Survey dummy -0.067  0.096  -1.617*** -1.465*** 0.576  
 (0.328)  (0.214)  (0.517) (0.415) (0.596)  
Transition dummy -0.458* -0.486*** -0.498** -0.464*** -0.203  0.152  
 (0.251) (0.113) (0.207) (0.151) (0.359)  (0.411)  
R2 0.994 0.993 0.986 0.978     
‘R2’     0.973 0.972 0.971 0.968 
RMSE 0.168 0.141 0.200 0.227 0.360 0.363 0.424 0.440 
Sample size 22 22 23 23 33 33 33 33 
Note: The non-financial regressions use Ordinary Least Squares and a sample consisting of 19 countries with HBS data and 4 with survey data. 
The financial assets and liabilities regressions use the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method and a sample consisting of 35 countries with 
HBS or financial balance sheet data and 3 with survey data. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance: * 10% level; ** 5% level; *** 
1% level.   R2 is not a well-defined concept in generalized least squares, so as is customary the fraction of the variance in the dependent variable 
that is ‘explained’ in each regression is referred to as ‘R2’ here. 
Sources: (a) Life expectancy in 1980, gdp growth gdp per capita growth, population growth, market capitalization rate, availability of domestic 
credit, urban population and fixed line and mobile phone subscribers are from World Development Indicators 2005-2008. b) Personal disposable 
income is from the EIU. See The Economist Intelligence Unit (2005). (c) Data for Taiwan is from the National Statistical Office’s website.   
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Appendix V: Population, wealth and GDP by country, 2000 
     PPP$   US$ at official exchange rates  
 
population 
(000s) 
adults 
(000s) 
Share of 
world 
population 
(%) 
Share of 
adult 
population 
(%) 
Wealth 
per capita
Wealth 
per adult
Share of 
world 
wealth 
(%) 
GDP per 
capita 
Share of 
world 
GDP (%)  
Wealth 
per capita
Wealth 
per adult
Share of 
world 
wealth 
(%) 
GDP per 
capita 
Share of 
world 
GDP (%)
Wealth 
Gini 
North America                 
Canada 30689 22764 0.50 0.62 89252 120326 1.68 28731 1.89  70916 95606 1.73 22828 2.18 0.688 
USA  284154 202865 4.67 5.49 143727 201319 25.10 35619 21.67  143727 201319 32.51 35619 31.47 0.801 
Europe                 
Albania 3062 1851 0.05 0.05 12444 20591 0.02 3658 0.02  3737 6184 0.01 1099 0.01 0.642 
Austria 8096 6271 0.13 0.17 76234 98418 0.38 24836 0.43  71408 92189 0.46 23264 0.59 0.646 
Belarus 10029 7335 0.17 0.20 21507 29408 0.13 8738 0.19  2503 3422 0.02 1017 0.03 0.628 
Belgium 10304 7896 0.17 0.21 120977 157868 0.77 25008 0.55  107950 140868 0.89 22315 0.72 0.662 
Bulgaria 7997 6192 0.13 0.17 18805 24286 0.09 6356 0.11  4340 5605 0.03 1467 0.04 0.652 
Croatia 4505 3430 0.07 0.09 18925 24859 0.05 9547 0.09  8620 11323 0.03 4349 0.06 0.654 
Czech Rep. 10267 7889 0.17 0.21 32431 42205 0.21 14844 0.33  10797 14051 0.09 4942 0.16 0.626 
Denmark 5340 4072 0.09 0.11 66191 86807 0.22 28539 0.33  70751 92787 0.30 30505 0.51 0.808 
Estonia 1367 1016 0.02 0.03 22859 30740 0.02 10873 0.03  7301 9819 0.01 3473 0.02 0.675 
Finland 5177 3905 0.09 0.11 53154 70461 0.17 24416 0.27  50984 67584 0.21 23419 0.38 0.615 
France 59278 44358 0.97 1.20 94557 126360 3.45 23614 3.00  85794 114650 4.05 21425 3.95 0.730 
Germany 82344 64810 1.35 1.75 90768 115325 4.59 23917 4.22  86369 109735 5.66 22758 5.83 0.667 
Greece 10975 8568 0.18 0.23 78161 100117 0.53 15558 0.37  53921 69068 0.47 10733 0.37 0.654 
Hungary 10226 7834 0.17 0.21 24751 32308 0.16 11063 0.24 10343 13500 0.08 4623 0.15 0.651 
Iceland 281 194 0.01 0.01 50784 73400 0.01 26929 0.02  57447 83030 0.01 30461 0.03 0.664 
Ireland 3801 2646 0.06 0.07 136680 196376 0.32 27197 0.22 126318 181489 0.38 25135 0.30 0.581 
Italy 57715 46416 0.95 1.26 120897 150327 4.29 22876 2.83  98317 122250 4.52 18604 3.34 0.609 
Latvia 2373 1770 0.04 0.05 15935 21369 0.02 8305 0.04  5780 7751 0.01 3013 0.02 0.670 
Lithuania 3500 2548 0.06 0.07 19703 27067 0.04 8397 0.06  7192 9879 0.02 3065 0.03 0.666 
Luxembourg 435 328 0.01 0.01 173137 229451 0.05 48968 0.05  151765 201127 0.05 42923 0.06 0.650 
Macedonia 2010 1398 0.03 0.04 14484 20819 0.02 5506 0.02  4613 6631 0.01 1754 0.01 0.661 
Malta 392 284 0.01 0.01 105038 145031 0.03 18256 0.02  56161 77544 0.02 9761 0.01 0.664 
Moldova 4275 2894 0.07 0.08 8704 12858 0.02 2212 0.02  1183 1748 0.00 301 0.00 0.691 
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Netherlands 15898 12046 0.26 0.33 121165 159910 1.18 25759 0.88  109418 144406 1.38 23261 1.15 0.650 
Norway 4502 3337 0.07 0.09 90843 122553 0.25 32057 0.31  102074 137704 0.37 36021 0.50 0.633 
Poland 38649 27858 0.64 0.75 24654 34204 0.59 9661 0.80  10438 14481 0.32 4090 0.49 0.657 
Portugal 10225 7878 0.17 0.21 53811 69840 0.34 17089 0.37  33421 43377 0.27 10614 0.34 0.667 
Romania 22117 16431 0.36 0.44 13642 18362 0.19 5024 0.24  4436 5971 0.08 1634 0.11 0.651 
Russia 146560 107493 2.41 2.91 14672 20005 1.32 9996 3.14  2530 3449 0.30 1723 0.79 0.699 
Slovakia 5400 3900 0.09 0.11 27201 37662 0.09 12619 0.15  7693 10652 0.03 3569 0.06 0.629 
Slovenia 1967 1521 0.03 0.04 31127 40248 0.04 16983 0.07  16733 21636 0.03 9130 0.06 0.626 
Spain 40717 32165 0.67 0.87 93086 117837 2.33 19037 1.66 68693 86958 2.23 14048 1.78 0.570 
Sweden 8877 6735 0.15 0.18 73570 96961 0.40 24628 0.47  77085 101594 0.55 25805 0.71 0.742 
Switzerland 7167 5497 0.12 0.15 140346 182992 0.62 28209 0.43  166208 216712 0.95 33407 0.74 0.803 
Ukraine 49116 36573 0.81 0.99 14010 18815 0.42 5147 0.54  1751 2352 0.07 643 0.10 0.667 
UK 58670 43871 0.96 1.19 128959 172461 4.65 24252 3.05  126832 169617 5.92 23852 4.35 0.697 
Rich Asia Pacific                 
Australia 19071 13690 0.31 0.37 90906 126635 1.07 27193 1.11  67990 94712 1.03 20338 1.21 0.622 
Hong Kong 6637 5085 0.11 0.14 175191 228675 0.72 27893 0.40  150206 196062 0.79 23915 0.49 0.740 
Israel 6084 3836 0.10 0.10 72009 114210 0.27 19148 0.25  66581 105601 0.32 17705 0.34 0.677 
Japan 127034 100933 2.09 2.73 124858 157146 9.75 25924 7.05  180837 227600 18.28 37547 14.83 0.547 
Korea 46779 33242 0.77 0.90 41439 58314 1.19 14937 1.50  26832 37758 1.00 9671 1.41 0.579 
Macao 444 310 0.01 0.01 86672 124280 0.02 23118 0.02  53131 76186 0.02 14172 0.02 0.580 
New Zealand 3818 2678 0.06 0.07 55823 79585 0.13 20008 0.16 37026 52786 0.11 13271 0.16 0.651 
Singapore 4017 2890 0.07 0.08 113632 157942 0.28 28644 0.25  90960 126429 0.29 22929 0.29 0.689 
Taiwan 22191 15476 0.37 0.42 100009 143405 1.36 19714 0.94 73654 105613 1.30 14519 1.00 0.655 
China and India                 
China 1251788 842063 20.57 22.77 12819 19056 9.86 3844 10.30  2973 4420 2.96 891 3.47 0.550 
India 1021084 570595 16.78 15.43 6718 12021 4.22 2684 5.87  1146 2052 0.93 458 1.45 0.669 
Other Asia Pacific                 
Armenia 3082 1986 0.05 0.05 14921 23155 0.03 3068 0.02  2420 3755 0.01 498 0.01 0.684 
Azerbaijan 8143 4816 0.13 0.13 9109 15402 0.05 3555 0.06  1677 2836 0.01 654 0.02 0.678 
Bangladesh 128916 66483 2.12 1.80 3988 7734 0.32 1772 0.49  780 1513 0.08 347 0.14 0.660 
Cambodia 12744 5847 0.21 0.16 2089 4553 0.02 1859 0.05  322 703 0.00 287 0.01 0.714 
Fiji 811 453 0.01 0.01 12110 21669 0.01 4950 0.01 4988 8924 0.00 2039 0.01 0.709 
Georgia 4720 3326 0.08 0.09 30286 42976 0.09 5315 0.05  3372 4784 0.01 592 0.01 0.725 
Indonesia 209174 124446 3.44 3.37 8116 13642 1.04 4035 1.81 1466 2464 0.24 729 0.47 0.764 
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Iran 66365 34053 1.09 0.92 12051 23486 0.49 7202 1.02  7971 15534 0.42 4764 0.98 0.707 
Jordan 4972 2474 0.08 0.07 12020 24154 0.04 4282 0.05  4747 9539 0.02 1691 0.03 0.678 
Kazakhstan 15033 9507 0.25 0.26 13256 20961 0.12 8331 0.27  1967 3110 0.02 1236 0.06 0.655 
Kyrgyzstan 4952 2706 0.08 0.07 7984 14612 0.02 3205 0.03  668 1222 0.00 268 0.00 0.680 
Lebanon 3398 2024 0.06 0.06 27438 46070 0.06 6089 0.04  17148 28793 0.05 3806 0.04 0.762 
Malaysia 22997 12944 0.38 0.35 23239 41288 0.33 9422 0.46  9479 16841 0.17 3843 0.28 0.733 
Pakistan 142648 67968 2.34 1.84 5904 12390 0.52 2158 0.66  1176 2469 0.13 430 0.19 0.698 
Papua N. Guinea 5299 2544 0.09 0.07 2477 5159 0.01 2326 0.03  687 1432 0.00 645 0.01 0.738 
Philippines 75766 39206 1.25 1.06 14780 28562 0.69 4065 0.66 3682 7116 0.22 1013 0.24 0.717 
Saudi Arabia 21484 10992 0.35 0.30 14355 28056 0.19 12374 0.57  10175 19887 0.17 8771 0.59 0.737 
Sri Lanka 19848 12689 0.33 0.34 21634 33839 0.26 3841 0.16  4745 7422 0.08 842 0.05 0.665 
Syria 16813 7920 0.28 0.21 7337 15576 0.08 4338 0.16  8386 17803 0.11 4958 0.26 0.704 
Tajikistan 6159 2866 0.10 0.08 4106 8823 0.02 1380 0.02  415 892 0.00 140 0.00 0.664 
Thailand 61438 40160 1.01 1.09 19835 30344 0.75 6715 0.88  5875 8987 0.29 1989 0.38 0.710 
Turkey 68234 40391 1.12 1.09 16372 27657 0.69 7414 1.08  6605 11158 0.36 2991 0.64 0.718 
Viet Nam 78671 44025 1.29 1.19 8178 14613 0.40 2012 0.34  1614 2884 0.10 397 0.10 0.682 
Yemen 17937 7209 0.30 0.20 892 2219 0.01 1293 0.05  336 836 0.01 487 0.03 0.613 
Latin America and Caribbean              
Antigua and Barbuda 77 52 0.00 0.00 30683 45291 0.00 18007 0.00  17274 25497 0.00 10137 0.00 0.747 
Argentina 36896 23307 0.61 0.63 44923 71115 1.02 11729 0.93  29664 46959 0.87 7745 0.89 0.740 
Barbados 266 190 0.00 0.01 107153 150298 0.02 17526 0.01 60006 84167 0.01 9815 0.01 0.706 
Belize 242 119 0.00 0.00 20327 41213 0.00 7170 0.00  9655 19576 0.00 3406 0.00 0.763 
Bolivia 8317 4171 0.14 0.11 4110 8196 0.02 2934 0.05 1396 2784 0.01 996 0.03 0.762 
Brazil 173858 104213 2.86 2.82 16519 27559 1.77 7745 2.88  7492 12498 1.04 3512 1.90 0.784 
Chile 15412 9809 0.25 0.27 45329 71221 0.43 10389 0.34  20222 31773 0.25 4635 0.22 0.777 
Colombia 42120 24197 0.69 0.65 18000 31334 0.47 5796 0.52  5957 10370 0.20 1918 0.25 0.765 
Costa Rica 3929 2284 0.07 0.06 26554 45681 0.06 5873 0.05  18825 32386 0.06 4164 0.05 0.732 
Dominica 78 46 0.00 0.00 23372 39513 0.00 8284 0.00  10474 17708 0.00 3712 0.00 0.763 
Dominican Rep. 8265 4462 0.14 0.12 14223 26344 0.07 5654 0.10  5918 10961 0.04 2352 0.06 0.723 
Ecuador 12306 6770 0.20 0.18 9411 17108 0.07 3720 0.10  2717 4940 0.03 1074 0.04 0.760 
El Salvador 6280 3389 0.10 0.09 12150 22517 0.05 4622 0.06  5551 10288 0.03 2112 0.04 0.746 
Guatemala 11166 4986 0.18 0.14 8911 19957 0.06 4335 0.10  3444 7712 0.03 1675 0.06 0.779 
Guyana 744 433 0.01 0.01 6995 12021 0.00 4072 0.01  1645 2828 0.00 958 0.00 0.707 
Haiti 7939 3745 0.13 0.10 3800 8056 0.02 1798 0.03  984 2086 0.01 466 0.01 0.755 
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Honduras 6424 3025 0.11 0.08 5572 11833 0.02 2164 0.03  2377 5048 0.01 923 0.02 0.743 
Jamaica 2585 1478 0.04 0.04 16457 28775 0.03 3464 0.02  13528 23653 0.03 2848 0.02 0.686 
Mexico 100088 56132 1.65 1.52 19561 34879 1.20 9711 2.08  11895 21210 0.95 5905 1.84 0.749 
Nicaragua 4959 2279 0.08 0.06 5781 12577 0.02 1947 0.02  1404 3054 0.01 473 0.01 0.755 
Panama 2950 1731 0.05 0.05 25776 43935 0.05 6650 0.04  13404 22846 0.03 3458 0.03 0.766 
Paraguay 5470 2703 0.09 0.07 16335 33058 0.06 4801 0.06  4654 9418 0.02 1368 0.02 0.766 
Peru 25952 14348 0.43 0.39 10245 18531 0.16 4799 0.27  4462 8071 0.09 2090 0.17 0.738 
Puerto Rico 3835 2609 0.06 0.07 85219 125269 0.20 22242 0.18  61293 90098 0.19 15998 0.19 0.753 
St Kitts and Nevis 40 24 0.00 0.00 18919 31985 0.00 14627 0.00 9880 16703 0.00 7639 0.00 0.763 
St Lucia 154 89 0.00 0.00 23519 40644 0.00 6823 0.00  15593 26945 0.00 4523 0.00 0.763 
St Vincent-Grenadines 116 64 0.00 0.00 17556 31620 0.00 7847 0.00  6502 11711 0.00 2906 0.00 0.741 
Trinidad and Tobago 1285 817 0.02 0.02 59612 93754 0.05 13721 0.04  26116 41075 0.03 6011 0.02 0.689 
Uruguay 3342 2259 0.06 0.06 26344 38973 0.05 10285 0.07  15393 22773 0.04 6009 0.06 0.708 
Venezuela 24418 13707 0.40 0.37 17155 30560 0.26 7232 0.38  11845 21100 0.23 4994 0.38 0.712 
Africa                 
Algeria 30463 16353 0.50 0.44 7308 13613 0.14 6107 0.40  2098 3909 0.05 1754 0.17 0.670 
Benin 7197 3112 0.12 0.08 2216 5124 0.01 1225 0.02  624 1444 0.00 345 0.01 0.713 
Botswana 1754 851 0.03 0.02 14266 29407 0.02 7703 0.03  5545 11429 0.01 2994 0.02 0.751 
Burkina Faso 11292 4591 0.19 0.12 1479 3637 0.01 986 0.02  292 718 0.00 195 0.01 0.728 
Burundi 6486 2607 0.11 0.07 1437 3575 0.01 619 0.01  251 624 0.00 108 0.00 0.699 
Cameroon 14856 6819 0.24 0.18 3400 7407 0.03 2301 0.07 814 1773 0.01 551 0.03 0.711 
Cape Verde 451 202 0.01 0.01 11001 24589 0.00 4299 0.00  3239 7240 0.00 1266 0.00 0.688 
Central African Rep. 3777 1738 0.06 0.05 1276 2774 0.00 1148 0.01 280 609 0.00 252 0.00 0.782 
Chad 8216 3501 0.14 0.10 1337 3138 0.01 959 0.02  255 598 0.00 183 0.01 0.681 
Comoros 699 315 0.01 0.01 3474 7702 0.00 1823 0.00  689 1529 0.00 362 0.00 0.711 
Congo Dem. Rep. 50052 21050 0.82 0.57 1288 3062 0.04 669 0.07  166 394 0.01 86 0.01 0.711 
Congo Rep. 3438 1468 0.06 0.04 2570 6021 0.01 2533 0.02  1037 2428 0.00 1022 0.01 0.711 
Côte d'Ivoire 16735 7529 0.28 0.20 3936 8749 0.04 2028 0.07  1137 2527 0.02 586 0.03 0.712 
Egypt 67285 35550 1.11 0.96 10146 19203 0.42 4406 0.64  3507 6637 0.19 1523 0.32 0.689 
Equatorial Guinea 449 206 0.01 0.01 3026 6584 0.00 10302 0.01  863 1877 0.00 2938 0.00 0.688 
Ethiopia 68525 30020 1.13 0.81 1053 2404 0.04 720 0.11  144 328 0.01 98 0.02 0.652 
Gabon 1272 603 0.02 0.02 6315 13318 0.01 7780 0.02  3254 6861 0.00 4008 0.02 0.784 
Gambia 1316 643 0.02 0.02 1650 3374 0.00 1329 0.00  401 821 0.00 323 0.00 0.723 
Ghana 19867 9418 0.33 0.26 3776 7965 0.05 1376 0.06  709 1495 0.01 258 0.02 0.692 
60 
Guinea 8434 3876 0.14 0.11 2626 5715 0.01 2961 0.05  361 785 0.00 407 0.01 0.693 
Guinea-Bissau 1366 588 0.02 0.02 603 1400 0.00 738 0.00  147 342 0.00 180 0.00 0.710 
Kenya 30689 13409 0.50 0.36 4203 9619 0.08 1316 0.09  1106 2532 0.03 346 0.03 0.699 
Lesotho 1788 825 0.03 0.02 2606 5649 0.00 1492 0.01  770 1669 0.00 441 0.00 0.767 
Madagascar 16195 7260 0.27 0.20 1397 3116 0.01 877 0.03  398 887 0.01 249 0.01 0.722 
Malawi 11512 4970 0.19 0.13 1537 3561 0.01 808 0.02  313 725 0.00 165 0.01 0.736 
Mali 11647 4691 0.19 0.13 874 2170 0.01 996 0.03  186 462 0.00 212 0.01 0.750 
Mauritania 2645 1225 0.04 0.03 3370 7279 0.01 1729 0.01  796 1720 0.00 409 0.00 0.686 
Mauritius 1186 779 0.02 0.02 70234 106929 0.05 14406 0.04 18007 27415 0.02 3693 0.01 0.661 
Morocco 29231 16167 0.48 0.44 10805 19535 0.19 4299 0.27  2929 5295 0.07 1165 0.11 0.690 
Mozambique 17911 8088 0.29 0.22 1224 2711 0.01 1113 0.04  237 524 0.00 215 0.01 0.689 
Namibia 1894 874 0.03 0.02 7384 15998 0.01 6058 0.03  2196 4759 0.00 1802 0.01 0.847 
Niger 11782 4758 0.19 0.13 849 2101 0.01 902 0.02  159 393 0.00 169 0.01 0.729 
Nigeria 117608 51431 1.93 1.39 622 1423 0.05 826 0.21  244 559 0.02 325 0.12 0.736 
Rwanda 8025 3250 0.13 0.09 1686 4163 0.01 976 0.02  364 900 0.00 211 0.01 0.714 
Senegal 10343 4547 0.17 0.12 2795 6357 0.02 1681 0.04  762 1734 0.01 459 0.02 0.697 
Seychelles 77 43 0.00 0.00 28111 50598 0.00 11644 0.00  18252 32853 0.00 7561 0.00 0.760 
Sierra Leone 4509 2136 0.07 0.06 738 1558 0.00 734 0.01  128 269 0.00 127 0.00 0.687 
South Africa 45610 25480 0.75 0.69 16266 29118 0.46 8017 0.78  5977 10699 0.22 2946 0.42 0.763 
Swaziland 1023 444 0.02 0.01 6789 15636 0.00 5047 0.01 1732 3988 0.00 1287 0.00 0.780 
Tanzania 34763 15569 0.57 0.42 932 2080 0.02 490 0.04  509 1137 0.01 268 0.03 0.676 
Togo 5364 2379 0.09 0.06 2314 5219 0.01 926 0.01 674 1519 0.00 270 0.00 0.711 
Tunisia 9563 5638 0.16 0.15 21716 36836 0.13 7130 0.15  6179 10481 0.05 2029 0.06 0.693 
Uganda 24309 9370 0.40 0.25 2207 5726 0.03 1030 0.05  551 1429 0.01 257 0.02 0.723 
Zambia 10702 4517 0.18 0.12 1550 3672 0.01 841 0.02  577 1366 0.01 313 0.01 0.766 
Zimbabwe 12595 5631 0.21 0.15 7695 17212 0.06 2607 0.07  1642 3674 0.02 556 0.02 0.845 
Other countries 294154 156876 4.83 4.24   1.98  2.09    1.39  1.47  
World 6085576 3697511 100.00 100.00 26738 44024 100.00 7675 100.00  20646 33981 100.00 5285 100.00 0.804 
 
 
